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 In this dissertation I investigate start-up financing by nascent entrepreneurs in the 
United States between 2005 and 2010. By nascent entrepreneur, I mean individuals who 
are in the process of creating a new business, but the business itself is not yet affecting 
prices and quantities in the market. Nearly all research on financing has focused on 
established firms. Little work, however, has been done on how entrepreneurs acquire and 
use financial resources during the earliest stages of the firm creation process. The 
availability of financial resources has been linked to firm growth and survivability, and 
understanding how entrepreneurs use and acquire money is critical to understanding new 
firm creation. 
 Two theories on entrepreneurial risk, introduced by Joseph Schumpeter and Frank 
Knight, frame this study. These theories offer differing explanations as to who bears the 
risks of entrepreneurship – whether it is borne by those providing financial capital, or by 
the entrepreneurs themselves. I address this difference by examining the financing 
behavior nascent entrepreneurs. Specifically, I introduce three groups of nascent 
entrepreneurs, categorized by the amount of financial resources used and acquired to 
create a new venture. The three groups are non-financers who use $0 - $500; average-
financers who use an amount near the mean of $24,077; and macro-financers who use 
$230,000 - $27.5 million. Chapter 1 looks at whether the amount of money affects the 
likelihood of nascent entrepreneurs starting a new firm, or disengaging from the process. 
Chapter 2 investigates the sources of start-up financing, and whether nascent 
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entrepreneurs bear the risks of entrepreneurship. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the two 
outlier groups of nascent entrepreneurs – non-financers and macro-financers. 
 Results indicate that nascent entrepreneurs do bear the initial risks of 
entrepreneurship, before external financiers participate in the start-up process. Over 90% 
of individuals starting businesses in the U.S. use personal savings to finance their nascent 
ventures. Financing from external-formal sources, such as banks, is more likely to be 
acquired later in the process. Contrary to findings from many studies on start-up 
financing, I find that personal characteristics of the entrepreneur (e.g., sex, race, 
educational attainment, and experience) do affect the likelihood of acquiring both formal 
and informal sources. 
 Interestingly, macro-financers and non-financers start new firms at roughly the 
same rate, yet there is no standard type of firm created by each group. Nascent 
entrepreneurs within these groups have varying levels of experience, come from varying 
demographics, and start different types of firms using different types of resources. My 
investigation into these two outlier groups reveals that while traditional Knightian views 
on risk and uncertainty are supported, the risks of entrepreneurship may have as much to 
do with matching the right resources to the right opportunity as they do with calculating 
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 I often invite local entrepreneurs to share their experiences with the university 
students enrolled in my entrepreneurship courses. The following is a recent interaction 
between one student and a local entrepreneur, Devin, who owns and operates a highly 
successful transmission repair shop. 
 
 Devin: “How much money does it take to start a business?” 
 Student: “Well, we learned that, on average, people spend between five and 
  twenty-five thousand dollars of their own money.” 
 Devin: “Wrong. The answer is all of it. Five to twenty-five thousand just  
  happens to be the amount that „all of it‟ is for most people.” 
 
 Devin raises an important issue. Much of what we teach on the topic of start-up 
financing falls into two stereotypes. On the one hand is the idea that the entrepreneur 
must have “skin in the game” – that is, the individual or team starting the business must 
contribute a significant amount of personal money toward the creation of the new 
venture. The act of making personal, financial contributions signals to outsiders (e.g., 
investors, future partners, and potential suppliers) that the entrepreneur is confident in his 
or her abilities. It also demonstrates that the entrepreneur is willing to assume part of the 
risk while developing the venture. This is important since the entrepreneur, presumably, 
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understands best how to mobilize the necessary resources to transform the opportunity 
into a financial sustainable new firm. 
 On the other hand is the “friends, family, and fools” stereotype of start-up 
financing. This assumes that the entrepreneur acquires most funds externally. Friends and 
family are those individuals that have developed a personal relationship with the 
entrepreneur and are likely to interact frequently. Banks, angel investors, venture 
capitalists, and others are the “fools” that invest their money in spite of significant 
information asymmetries. For example, an outside investor may be convinced to finance 
a business idea in an attractive industry, despite the risk of inaccurately assessing the 
entrepreneur‟s skills and motivations. 
 Underlying both stereotypes is issue of who should bear the risk in 
entrepreneurship. In academic research, the idea of the entrepreneur accepting full 
responsibility for her efforts, and bearing all the risk in the process, stretches back to 18
th
 
century France with Richard Cantillion‟s Essai on the role of the entrepreneur in the 
economy (Hébert, 1985). In 1921, American economist Frank Knight reintroduced the 
principal of entrepreneur as risk-bearer in his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Hébert 
& Link, 2009). Knight first differentiates between risk – situations where a market exists 
and the “unknowns” are probabilities known to all; and uncertainty –  situations where no 
market exists, the unknowns are not known, and probabilities cannot be calculated 
(1921). Risk, therefore, is information available to all parties involved. The role of the 
entrepreneur is to shoulder the uncertainty so that outside investors don‟t have to. 
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 The narrative of entrepreneur as risk-bearer is elaborated on in later research. 
Knight explicitly outlines the functions of the entrepreneur, stating that the he or she 
should lead through innovation, forecast and adapt to changes, and that “…as owner of 
any enterprise, [place] himself in the position to take the consequences of such 
changes...[and] in this regard, the entrepreneur is simply a specialist in risk-taking or 
uncertainty bearing...” (1942). This view is directly informed by probability theory. 
Successful entrepreneurship will depend on whether individuals with unique skills and 
abilities can act on probability estimates that are clearer to themselves than to others 
(Miller, 2007). 
 The entrepreneur, therefore, has all of the information, or at least most of it. The 
external financier trying to decide whether to fund the entrepreneur cannot calculate all of 
the risks involved in starting the venture. It is for this reason that personal financial 
contributions made by the entrepreneur are so important. They signal outside investors 
that the individual starting the business is willing to lose something as well. 
 But not all scholars agree that the entrepreneur alone bears the risk. For Austrian 
economist Joseph Schumpeter, the role of the financier and the role of the entrepreneur 
are completely distinct. The entrepreneur is solely responsible for innovation and 
technological changes; earning profits by introducing into the economy new 
combinations of products, means of production, or  new markets (Hébert & Link, 2009; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Schumpeter is explicit in his view on the entrepreneur as risk-bearer 
and attacks the notion throughout his career (Kanbur, 1980). In The Theory of Economic 
Development, he says (page 137), “The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer” 
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(Schumpeter, 1934). Rather, it is the capitalist (financier) who bears the risk since he or 
she stands to lose the financial resource should the entrepreneur fail. Even if an 
entrepreneur self-finances and subsequently fails to create a new firm, the entrepreneur 
fails as a capitalist, not as an innovator (Schumpeter, 1954). The friends, family, and 
fools narrative is therefore rooted in the assumption that the entrepreneur transfers the 
risk to those financing the venture. 
 
Research Questions 
 The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the financing of emerging firms from 
the perspective of the nascent entrepreneur. An emerging firm is defined as the sum of 
the actions taken by an individual to start a business, but the business itself is not yet 
operational. The successful outcome from these actions is an up-and-running business. 
The nascent entrepreneur is the individual acting to create the new business. 
 Studying entrepreneurial financing in the context of nascent entrepreneurship is 
important from a theoretical standpoint. Ultimately, theories on risk reflect differing 
views on the role of the entrepreneur in the economy (Iversen, Jørgensen, & Malchow-
Mller, 2007). In the previous section I outlined Knightian and Schumpeterian views – 
Knight‟s entrepreneur is a business owner that shields external stakeholders from risk, 
while Schumpeter‟s entrepreneur is an innovator that creates unique combinations of 
resources. Studies that measure entrepreneurship as self-employment, as having acquired 
a business license, or as having legally registered the business (e.g., as a sole-
proprietorship, partnership, or corporation), will only capture the Knightian aspect of risk 
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as these stock measures do not take into account the overall flow of entrepreneurial 
activity (2007). Inferences on Schumpeterian entrepreneurship require a more nuanced 
look at other actions performed during the venture creation process, such as raising 
money, marketing efforts, or writing a business plan. 
 The context of nascent entrepreneurship is important for empirical considerations 
as well. Traditionally, studies on firm financing have analyzed large corporations, IPOs, 
or firms that are well-established and actively participating in the economy. These studies 
generally examine financing as debt versus equity and how debt structuring can reduce 
agency costs, or be used as a strategic tool in product markets (Milton & Raviv, 1991). 
Debts, for example, can be issued in exchange for stock. This reduces information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders by compelling managers to pay out 
cash flows more predictably. A related body of literature has focused on the capital 
structure and financing choices of small firms. These studies examine differences 
between large and small firm financing, financial bootstrapping, and whether 
characteristics of the entrepreneur affect financial decision making. Whether researching 
the acquisition of financial capital by large firms, or by smaller firms, scholars have 
almost exclusively relied on samples of established, successful businesses (Åstebro & 
Bernhardt, 2003; Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1995; Ou & Haynes, 2006; Verheul & 
Thurik, 2001). 
 However, how nascent entrepreneurs acquire financial resources during the 
earliest stages of the start-up process is a topic largely untouched by scholars. Reynolds 
(2007) and Reynolds and Curtin (2007a) offer some insight into the broad characteristics 
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of nascent venture finance (e.g., amounts invested by individuals and teams), but these 
studies have not closely examined potential determinants of the types of financing 
acquired by nascent ventures, nor whether the source and amount of financing are 
correlated with the success or failure of a nascent venture. 
 Whether money matters for getting into business is the question of primary 
concern in this dissertation. The current chapter addresses this question in the theoretical 
context of the nature of risk. Chapter 2 empirically examines the early acquisition of 
financial resources to determine whether it is the entrepreneur, or the financier, who bears 
the risks of entrepreneurship. 
 
 Research Question One: Does money matter for getting into business? 
 
 Research Question Two: Do nascent entrepreneurs follow a specific pattern when
 acquiring certain sources of funds? 
 
 A secondary goal of this dissertation is to develop a more comprehensive 
overview of nascent financing that moves beyond theories of entrepreneurial risk. 
Traditionally, studies formalizing Knight‟s “entrepreneur as risk-bearer” theory have 
treated the topic as a choice where risk averse individuals select wage jobs, and risk 
takers select entrepreneurship (Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979). However, this assumes that 
risk is endogenous to the entrepreneur and contingent on the amount of personal wealth. 
Wealthy individuals, under this assumption, are much more likely to become 
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entrepreneurs. Recent interpretations of Knight that recognize exogenous risks involved 
with entrepreneurship conclude that resource-rich individuals are actually at greater risk 
when starting a business then resource-poor (Newman, 2007). For a resource-poor 
entrepreneur, a small change in resources will offset the cost of the effort to acquire them; 
but for the resource-rich, gains in resources must be significant to justify the effort 
(2007). 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigate two extremes of nascent entrepreneur financing 
behavior: non-financers (nascent entrepreneurs that use little to no money to finance their 
start-up), and macro-financers (nascent entrepreneurs that use large amounts of money). 
Investigating these groups separately facilitates the incorporation of resource-based 
perspectives into the analysis of nascent financing. An entrepreneur may start with few 
resources, yet create a large corporation (e.g., Apple, Sierra On-Line, Whole Foods). 
Others may possess an abundance of resources, but liabilities associated with large 
resource endowments (e.g., reduced incentive to experiment, core rigidities) may inhibit 
growth (Mosakowski, 2002). From this perspective, risk is not about winning or losing, 
but whether the entrepreneur is able to match the resources in possession to the 
opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985). 
 Furthermore, interest in “high-impact” entrepreneurs (i.e., those who start 
businesses that contribute significantly to job creation and GDP), has risen considerably 
in the past decade among both researchers and policymakers. Nascent entrepreneurs 
using a lot of money may be pursuing higher quality opportunities. The likelihood of high 
performance in the future may be higher as well. Given the interest in high-impact 
 8 
entrepreneurship, and my goal of providing a more detailed look at nascent financing, 
Chapters 3 and 4 address the following research questions: 
 
 Research Question Three: Do macro-financing entrepreneurs exhibit specific
 characteristics compared to non-financers or average-financers? 
 
 Research Question Four: Do non-financing entrepreneurs succeed at creating
 new firms, and if so, what do they look like? 
 
 Figure 1.1 is a stylized depiction of the amount of money acquired by nascent 
entrepreneurs in the United States between 2005 and 2010. The data is from the Panel 
Studies of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (PSED II) – a nationally representative sample of 
adults in the United States who, between 2005 and 2010, were actively involved in 
starting a business. Non-financers make up 20% of all nascent entrepreneurs, and use 
between $0 and $500. On the other extreme are the macro-financers that make up 5% of 
all nascent entrepreneurs and use vast amounts of money ($230,000 - $27.5 million). 
Those remaining are average-financers that use amounts relatively close to the median, 
which is $8,500. Figure 1.1 is also an outline of this dissertation. 
 The actual distribution of nascent financing is actually highly skewed, with the 
majority of financing by nascent entrepreneurs occurring near the median and one in five 
use $500 or less. The macro-financers reside in a long tail. Figure 1.2 depicts the actual 
distribution of nascent financing in the U.S. 
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Figure 1.1 : Graphic Representation of the Distribution of Nascent Venture Financing 
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Figure 1.2 : Actual Distribution of Nascent Venture Financing in the United States 
  from 2005 – 2010, Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II (truncated 
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 Appendix A provides a detailed overview of the PSED research program. The 
principal objective of the PSED research program is to provide a comprehensive 
description of the business creation process (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). The PSED II is a 
representative, longitudinal sample of 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs in the United States. 
As of this writing five waves of data have been collected in 12-month intervals from 
2005 to 2010. 
  Identification of the nascent entrepreneurs began with a screening process of 
31,845 individuals. These individuals were contacted via a random digit dialing 
procedure between October, 2005 and January, 2006. Respondents answering “yes” to 
any of the following three questions were allowed to continue the screening process: 
 
 “Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including 
any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?” 
 “Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new 
venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work?” 
 “Are you, alone or with others, currently the owner of a business you help 
manage, including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?” 
 
 Finally, to be identified as a nascent entrepreneur, respondents had to meet each 
of the following criteria: (1) taken action in the past twelve months to start a business; (2) 
will personally own all or part of the business; (3) have  not received any money, income, 
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or fees for more than six of the past twelve months – or, if the business has received 
money, revenue cannot have exceeded expenses for more than six of the past twelve 
months; (4) monthly expenses cannot have included salaries or wages for the owners 
active in managing the business for more than six of the past twelve months. 
 Detailed interviews on the 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs were conducted by the 
University of Michigan‟s Institute for Social Research. Wave A interviews were 
completed as respondents were identified in the screener, and completed in January, 
2006. Waves B, C, D, and E were completed at 12-months, 24-months, 36-months, and 
48-months out, respectively (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007a). 
 
PSED II Outcome Measures, Finance Measures, and Finance Categories 
Outcome Measures in the PSED II 
 The nascent entrepreneurs‟ actions result in one of three potential outcomes: (1) a 
new firm; (2) disengagement from the process; or (3) continuation of the start-up effort. 
In the PSED II, “A new firm is defined as an independent commercial actor in the 
economy, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the market” (Reynolds & 
Curtin, 2008). For the respondent‟s efforts to be considered a new firm, the following 
three conditions must be met: (1) the business must have received money from sales for 
more than six of the past twelve months; (2) monthly revenue must have been more than 
monthly expenses for more than six of the past twelve months; and (3) salaries or wages 
of the owners had to have been included in the monthly expenses for more than six of the 
past twelve months. 
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 If the respondent indicates he or she has disengaged from the original business 
effort, then the final outcome is “disengaged”. If by Wave E the respondent has not 
disengaged or met the criteria for a new firm, the final outcome is “still trying”. In order 
to be categorized as “still trying”, the respondent must indicate that the business start-up 
is going to be a major career focus for the next twelve months; or have devoted more than 
160 hours to the start-up during the past twelve months. 
 Many research programs exist that explore different aspects of entrepreneurship. 
The PSED II fills a critical gap because it provides substantial detail on the start-up 
process, is a representative sample, includes many independent variables, and tracks 
nascent entrepreneurs from conception of the business idea until the early years of a new 
firm (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b). It is the only dataset of its kind in existence. For 
comparison, the following is a review of two common operational measures of 
entrepreneurship by Reynolds and Curtin (2007b): 
 
Self-employment. In the monthly current population survey, self-employed 
are those that meet a very narrow definition (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2002), “… those who work for profit or fees in their own business, professions, 
trades, or farms. Only the unincorporated self-employed are include in the self-
employed category since those whose businesses are incorporated are technically 
are wage and salary workers because they are paid employees of a corporation”. 
Those managers of business they own will be classified as “salaried 
administrators” working for their own business. It is not clear how two or more 
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persons that have formed a legal partnership would be treated in this classification 
scheme. About 80% of nascent entrepreneurs have a full-time or part-time job or 
are managing another business while they work on developing a new business. 
They will never be identified with a procedure that focuses solely on current labor 
force activity. Second, as discussed below, the median time to reach a resolution 
of the start-up process is about two years. Behavior identified in a single month 
does not provide a good representation of the extent of efforts to create new firms. 
Comprehensive firm registries. There are two federally sponsored efforts 
to maintain a complete census of employee establishments…The first reflects 
state unemployment insurance filings and is organized at the national level by the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The other reflects a combination of social security 
payments coordination with tax returns received by the Internal Revenue Service 
administered by the U.S. Census. A third nationally comprehensive business 
census is represented in a commercial credit rating program, organized as the 
Dun‟s Market Identifier file [DMI] by Dun and Bradstreet…these studies provide 
data on only a narrow part of the phenomena [although they do provide 
information on the rate of new firms entering the economy]. None provide 
systematic accounts on the earliest stage of the firm creation process, before the 
initiative is operational and is added to any type of business registry. 
 
 To reiterate a point made in the “Research Questions” section earlier in this 
chapter: the conceptual and operational definition of nascent entrepreneurship in the 
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PSED II is particularly suited to the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation. 
Theoretical measures of entrepreneurial risk ultimately reflect different ideas on the role 
of the entrepreneur in the economy. Studies rooted in Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
view the entrepreneur as an innovator or agent of change, while the Knightian 
entrepreneur is the residual claimant who insures all external stakeholders (Iversen, et al., 
2007). Most entrepreneurship studies use datasets that implicitly define entrepreneurship 
as whether the individual has applied for a business license, or has legally registered the 
business as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. Nascent entrepreneurs, 
however, are defined by the sum of all actions taken to start a business. Actions may 
include raising money, creating a business plan, marketing, or making a sale. The PSED 
II allows for inferences on both Knightian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, as it 
includes measures of entrepreneurial stock, and flow over time (2007). 
 
Finance Measures 
 This section describes the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. These 
form the basis of the analyses throughout this dissertation. Sections Q and R from the 
PSED II questionnaire contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by 
respondents. Certain types of funding require that the business be formally established by 
registering with an appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources 
acquired before registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration. 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 list the items from sections Q and R in the PSED II questionnaire. 
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 Variable | Source of Funding 
  Number | (before business registration) 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
 Q4    | Personal Savings 
 Q5 | Family loans 
 Q6 | Friends, employers, work colleagues 
 Q7 | Credit card loans 
 Q8 | Bank loan 
 Q9 | Asset backed loan (2nd mortgage, car) 
 Q10 | Other 
 Q12x | Total from all sources (Q4-Q10) 
Table 1.1 : Funding Sources in PSED II Questionnaire, Before Business Legally 
Registered. 
 
 Variable | Source of Funding 
  Number | (after business registration) 
-------------+------------------------------------------- 
 R6    | Asset backed debts 
 R7 | Leases on property and equipment 
 R8 | Bank line of credit, working capital 
 R9 | Supplier credit 
 R10 | Personal loans (post registration) 
 R11 | Loans from start-up team 
 R12 | Spouses, family, next of kin 
 R13 | Employees who do not own the startup 
 R14 | Personal loans from other individuals 
 R15 | Credit card 
 R16 | Bank loans 
 R17 | Venture Capital 
 R18 | Government agency (non-SBA) 
 R19 | SBA guaranteed bank loans 
 R20 | Other 
 R21x | Total from all sources (R6-R20) 
Table 1.2 : Funding Sources in PSED II Questionnaire, After Business Legally 
Registered. 
 
 In Wave A, respondents are asked, “What is the dollar amount provided by 
(you/[Name]) that came from [funding source]?” In waves B – E, for each source, 
respondents are asked to confirm the amounts given in the last interview before being 
asked, “What is the total dollar amount provided by (you/[Name]) that came from 
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[funding source] (including the amount you reported last year)?” Therefore, the total 
amount of each source acquired by a respondent will be equal to the amount given at the 
wave that corresponds to the respondent‟s final interview. 
 I am only interested in the total amount of financing acquired up until the 
respondent (a) starts a new firm, (b) disengages from the start-up process, or (c) is still 
trying to start a business by the final wave of data collection. In the PSED II, respondents 
who have successfully started a new firm are still followed all the way through to Wave 
E. For respondents who start a new firm before this point, I stop calculating the amount 
of financing acquired the moment they start a new business. 
 
Categories of Financers 
 Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 depict three cases from the PSED II data set, selected at 
random, from each of the three categories of financer (non-financer, average-financer, 
and macro-financer). These cases should not be interpreted as being representative of the 
nascent entrepreneurs within each group. They do, however, reveal some of the 








ENTREPRENEUR A – “THE NON-FINANCER” 
 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Male, Caucasian, age 40-44, married. As of 2005, unemployed with high 
school education and renting a dwelling in a center city of a 
metropolitan area in the Pacific census division. Has 6 years 
experience in his start-up’s industry, and no prior start-up 
experience. 
 
Net income: $57,000 
Net worth: -$63,000 
 
THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
Entrepreneur A is starting a reupholstery and furniture repair 
business. He wants to start the business because he has talent in the 
field, and passion for the work. The opportunities that prompted him to 
start the business are an untapped market, and high demand for the 
service. The main problems he is running into are acquiring financing, 
and equipment costs. He never wrote a business plan. He first started 
thinking about starting the business in March, 2005, and has devoted 
1,000 hours to the new business. 
 
TOTAL FINANCING: $500 from personal savings. 
OUTCOME:  NEW FIRM established 2010. 
 
Figure 1.3 : Portrait of a “Non-Financer”. 
 
 
ENTREPRENEUR B – “THE AVERAGE-FINANCER” 
 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Female, Caucasian, age 45-49, married. As of 2005, working part time 
with a postgraduate degree and owning a dwelling in the Northeast, 
Middle Atlantic census division. Lives outside a city, but in a county 
adjacent to a city. Has 17 years experience in her start-up’s industry, 
and has never started a company before. 
 
Net income: $87,000 
Net worth: $514,000 
 
THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
Entrepreneur B is starting a computer systems and design service 
business. She wants to start the business to have another job and she 
describes the opportunity as stemming from an untapped market. The main 
problems she faces are acquiring information on the target market, and 
acquiring financing. She registered the company as a General 
Corporation and has also prepared a business plan. She first started 
thinking about the business in September, 2003, and has devoted 400 
hours to the new business. 
 
TOTAL FINANCING: $31,200 ($1,000 personal savings; $5,000 from family
 members; $23,000 bank line of credit; $2,200 from
 credit card). 
OUTCOME: NEW FIRM established 2009. 
 
Figure 1.4 : Portrait of an “Average-Financer”. 
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ENTREPRENEUR C – “THE MACRO-FINANCER” 
 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Male, Caucasian, age 45-49, married. As of 2005, working full time with 
a bachelor’s degree and owning a dwelling in the Pacific census 
division. Lives outside a city, but in a county adjacent to a city. Has 
25 years industry experience, and has never started a company before. 
 
Net income: $250,000 
Net worth: $2.15 million 
 
THE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 
Entrepreneur C is starting a custom computer programming business. He 
wants to start the business for lifestyle reasons – specifically, to 
try something new. He describes the opportunity as a new technology to 
be introduced to the market, and the main problem as acquiring 
information on the target market. He is working with 6 other team 
members. The business is registered as a General Corporation. He has 
not written a business plan. The business has developed proprietary 
technology. He started thinking about the business idea in summer, 
2002, and he’s devoted 500 hours to the business. 
 
TOTAL FINANCING: $13 million ($5 million from personal savings; $4
 million from a bank loan; $4 million from an asset
 backed loan likely a second mortgage. 
OUTCOME: DISENGAGED in 2008. 
 
Figure 1.5 : Portrait of a “Macro-Financer”. 
 
Literature Review on Firm Financing 
 In this section I present an overview of the research on firm financing. I devote 
attention to the financing of small and young firms, from the perspective of the owner or 
entrepreneur. 
 
Acquisition of Financing 
 According to traditional theories of firm financing, individual‟s typically choose 
funding that minimizes the costs (and maximizes the benefits) associated with different 
sources of debt and equity (Modigliani & Merton, 1958; Titman & Wessels, 1988). For 
example, owners and managers may select funding sources that allows them to transfer 
risk, maintain control, or signal information asymmetries. Alternatively, they may search 
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for the cheapest available funding while maintaining control of the business (Milton & 
Raviv, 1991).  
 Individuals can also structure their financing to address agency conflicts within 
the organization. Agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders occur because 
shareholders, as residual claimants, have incentive to increase the operating and financial 
risk of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since debt holders assume most of the 
risk, owners take on riskier investments. To protect themselves debt holders may also 
impose monitoring and contractual policies on firms, especially when the firm is privy to 
valuable product and/or market information. This mitigates their concerns, but it also 
increases the cost of capital for the firm (Cassar, 2004). 
 The pecking order model of capital structure directly addresses the information 
asymmetries associated with agency conflicts. According to this theory, firms do not aim 
for a target debt ratio. Rather, capital structure emerges as the firm selects from funding 
sources that minimize the cost of capital (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Internal 
sources of funding (e.g. retained earnings) are used first since information asymmetry 
problems are non-existent. Debt is sought next, followed by outside equity. Individuals 
seek outside equity last because the firm (presumably) has more information on itself 
than the investor. The presence of significant information asymmetries causes the 
investor to charge a higher rate of return on equity than on debt (Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
 Several studies have empirically tested these theories using samples of larger, 
established firms and IPOs (Chirinko & Singha, 2000; Fama & French, 2002; Helwege & 
Liang, 1996; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1994). These firms are more likely to use their 
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capital structure for strategic purposes, or to maximize returns to shareholders. Owners 
and managers of small firms and new ventures, however, differ considerably from these 
larger firms and face different agency and information asymmetry challenges. The firms 
under their charge are not likely to be publically traded or incorporated, which limits the 
sources of financing available to them. Also, because they are not required to share as 
much information as publically traded companies, these firms are information opaque. 
This can result in high agency costs and information asymmetries. These individuals 
must therefore depend heavily on reputation building through repeated transactions, and 
on personal reputation, rather than capital structure considerations (Ang, 1991). Also, the 
financing decisions faced by the owners of small and new ventures are more complex. 
These decisions may be closely linked to the individual‟s wealth or social contacts. 
Business risk and personal risk are one and the same, if the firm is a sole-proprietorship. 
Consequentially, agency problems may be more intense as shareholders and partners are 
often made up of family and friends (Ang, 1992). The tools available for securing debt 
financing differ as well. Collateral for bank lines of credit and loans, personal guarantees, 
relationship lending, and shorter maturities on debt contracts to shield lenders from 
shifting risk profiles all serve to diminish the high information asymmetries between 
owners of new ventures and lenders (Berger & Udell, 2003). 
 To offset or avoid these complications, small-business owners often employ 
financial bootstrapping strategies. Financial bootstrapping is a method of meeting 
financial resource needs without resorting to sources of external financing (e.g., delaying 
payment to suppliers, borrowing equipment, or sharing office space) (Winborg & 
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Landström, 2001). Winborg and Landström‟s (2001) seminal study categorizes a sample 
of 900 Swedish small business managers into six categories: non-bootstrappers; delayers 
who delay payments to preserve cash-on-hand; owner-financers who rely on personal and 
family funds; minimizers who reduce accounts receivable and inventory as much as 
possible; relationship-oriented who depend on social networks; and subsidy-oriented who 
use government money to reduce financial cost and consists of high-growth, high-
potential firms. Each of these categories sheds light onto how small-business owners 
finance themselves. 
 Financial bootstrapping has been tested in the contexts of both industry and the 
lifecycle of the firm. Owners of technology-based firms place more importance on 
bootstrapping techniques that improve cash flows, compared to nontechnology-based 
firms (e.g. terminating agreements with late payers, using credit cards, charging interest 
on overdue accounts, and borrowing equipment) (Auken, 2005). Higher information 
asymmetries between the owners of technology-based firms and investors may make 
these investments riskier, which pushes the owners of these ventures to work harder for 
capital and preserve cash-flow (2005). Also, bootstrapping strategies may differ 
depending on the age of the firm. Owners of early stage firms may rely more on owner 
relationship-oriented techniques, while owners of more developed firms depend on 





Sources of Financing 
 Sources of firm financing are generally categorized as either “debt vs. equity” or 
“internal vs. external” (Cassar, 2004; Chaganti, et al., 1995; Fluck, 1998; Scherr, Sugrue, 
& Ward, 1993). While both categorizations may provide meaningful insights into the 
financing of established firms, financing acquired by nascent entrepreneurs more likely 
resembles the “internal vs. external” categorization. If internal suppliers of financing 
include individuals with a personal relationship to the entrepreneur, then most funding for 
small firms in the U.S. seems to come from insiders (i.e., the entrepreneur, the start-up 
team, family, and friends) (Berger & Udell, 1998). When outside investors do get 
involved, they pay close attention to the creditworthiness and reputation of the 
entrepreneur. For this reason, owners of young firms and low quality firms are more 
likely to depend on internal equity compared with older, high quality firms that are better 
able to attract external equity (Ou & Haynes, 2006). For nascent entrepreneurs starting 
innovative, high-potential ventures, patents and prototypes may be used as signals. 
Audretsch et al. (2009) use a cross-sectional sample of 906 nascent entrepreneurs who are 
actively seeking angel or venture capital financing. Their results indicate that patents and 
prototypes do increase the probability of acquiring external equity financing, but the 
effect is significant only when both occur together. They suggest that outside investors 
may view prototypes as signals of a tangible outcome (decreasing risk), and patents as 
signals that will secure a future return on investment. 
 Fluck et al. categorize financing according to source, and not contractual 
obligations such as debt and equity (1998). Using a sample of 541 entrepreneurial firms 
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in Wisconsin, they group financing sources into insiders (the entrepreneur, start-up team, 
friends, family, and business associates); outsiders who monitor the firm closely (banks, 
venture capitalists, private investors); stockholders; and bond holder. Their findings 
suggest that as the firm ages, the proportion of money from insiders increases early on 
until external investments begin to take over. 
 Cassar (2004) examines start-up financing early in the venture creation process. 
Using the 1996-1998 Business Longitudinal Survey by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, entrepreneurs are asked about amounts of debt and equity they carried within 
12 months of appearing on tax registers. The study‟s findings suggest that characteristics 
of the entrepreneur do not affect capital structure choice, once firm characteristics are 
considered. Larger firms seem more likely to use bank or other external financing, and 
firms with fewer tangible assets are financed informally compared to firms with greater 
tangible assets. 
 One of the key aspects of Cassar‟s study is that by capturing firms at such an early 
stage, survivorship bias is significantly reduced. However, the firms in the Australian 
sample are not true nascent ventures in the process of being created. Indeed, the sample 
includes firms that may employ up to 200 employees. And, while the scope of the survey 
encompasses most of the Australian economy, it does not include: (1) non-employing 
businesses; (2) government enterprises; or (3) business classified as agricultural, utilities, 
communication services, education, or health and community services (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2000). 
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Financing by Nascent Entrepreneurs 
 Since the vast majority of studies on start-up financing do not use samples of 
nascent entrepreneurs, there is a theoretical gap concerning whether financing relates to a 
nascent entrepreneur‟s success. Faced with this dearth of information, a stylized view of 
the facts, focusing on descriptive statistics, is a good point of departure for exploring 
theory and models (Boland, 2008; Kaldor, 1957). A number of recent studies address 
financing in this manner. Utilizing the Kauffman Firm Survey, a sample of 4,928 U.S. 
firms founded in 2004, Robb and Robinson find that: new firms have an average of 
$109,000 in financial capital with half coming from external sources; new firms depend 
more on formal, external debt (e.g., bank loans, credit lines, and owner-backed loans); on 
average, bank financing is seven times that of debt acquired internally, and levels of 
external debt compared to internal were high even for the smallest of firms; outside 
equity is acquired by 0.05% of the sample, and inside equity from family members by 5% 
(2010). The Kauffman Firm Survey is a random sample of Dun & Bradstreet listed firms, 
with an oversampling of high-tech firms based on the level of employment in research 
and development (Ballou et al., 2008). In the Robb and Robinson study, 36% of firms 
were sole proprietorships and 58% were incorporated; 50% were home-based; 24.5% had 
some form of intellectual property; 60% had no employees other than the founder (2010). 
 Other studies link financing to firm characteristics. For small businesses, firm 
leverage has been found to be negatively related to firm size, age, and credit quality; and 
positively related to the amount of physical assets (Cole, 2011). There is no apparent 
relation between firm leverage and race, though female-owned firms tend to use less 
 25 
leverage (2011). Two studies based on the PSED II reveal interesting findings linking 
financing to entrepreneur characteristics, and firm survival. During the nascent stage, 
while only 12% of non-owner founders provide financial resources, initial financial 
endowments, along with relevant work experience, lowers the risk of failure (Yang & 
Aldrich, 2011). Reynolds (2011) categorized financing into formal and informal sources, 
and finds that the average amount of informal support (funding acquired before being 
legally registered with a government agency) is $48,000, and formal support (funding 
acquired after legal registration) is $200,000. This study finds no relationship between 
informal/formal financial support, and nascent venture survivability. 
 
Hypotheses – Financing and Firm Outcomes 
 I now explore whether financing, in conjunction with characteristics of the 
entrepreneur, firm, and industry, affect the final outcome of the individual‟s attempt to 
start a new firm. Using theory from research on the sources of funding for new ventures 
(Cassar, 2004; Gartner, Frid, & Alexander, In Press; Headd, 2003), I offer a set of 
hypotheses about outcomes of the start-up process. I test these hypotheses using data 
from the PSED II. 
 While financial capital is a crucial resource for the founding of a new venture, it is 
just one of many factors that affect firm performance (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Large 
amounts of financial capital, whether from external sources or from the entrepreneur‟s 
personal savings, may signal the quality or market potential of the opportunity being 
pursued – or at the very least it is a manifestation of the belief that the capital provider 
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has in the business or the entrepreneur herself. Michaelas, et al. (1999) find that more 
leverage and debt are positively relative to future growth. Cassar (2004) finds that future 
growth is positively related to the use of bank financing. Financial capital can also serve 
as a buffer against random shocks, as well as provide the entrepreneur with more 
strategic options (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994). Both enhance the 
survivability of a new venture. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nascent entrepreneurs using large amounts of money to finance 
their nascent venture are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than 
those that use average amounts, or no money at all. 
 
 Entrepreneurs starting larger firms have been linked to the survival and 
performance of new firms. Geroski, et al. make a case for larger firms being more likely 
to survive (2010), and large new ventures are more likely to benefit from scale economies 
(Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994). Smaller companies have also been found to have higher 
death rates, compared to larger firms, although growth rates seem to be poor predictors of 
performance (Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009). Small-business 
owners may also have a difficult time with high transaction costs associated with the 
acquisition of resources such as formal funding or expensive equipment (Ang, 1992). 
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Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that expect their firm to be larger are less 
likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that expect their firm to 
be smaller. 
 
 Many institutions consider incorporation to be a signal of credibility and 
operational quality (Gartner, et al., In Press). Legal planning and the process of 
incorporating a business has been found to better protect the assets of the business and 
entrepreneur; and entrepreneurs are able to familiarize themselves with regulatory 
regimes in the process (Malach, Robinson, & Radcliffe, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are 
less likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that expect their firm 
to be smaller. 
 
 A recent study of young Swedish firms has found that industry level matters little 
for survival, and it matters even less for firms sales and sales growth (Short, McKelvie, 
Ketchen, & Chandler, 2009). I surmise, however, that nascent entrepreneurs face more 
complexity when attempting to start businesses in industries that are more asset intensive, 
such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. Larger capital outlays are required early 
in the venture creation process, compared to service industries such as consulting, 
financial services, and consumer services (Gartner, et al., In Press). 
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Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive 
industries are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than nascent 
entrepreneurs in service oriented industries. 
 
 Nascent entrepreneurs may benefit depending on their location. Concentrations of 
people and businesses enable sharing of culture and resources, as well as provide access 
to specialized knowledge (Plummer & Pe‟er, 2010). Firms located in strong clusters have 
been linked to higher rates of survival and performance (Wennberg & Lindqvist, 2010). 
Within metro areas, immigrant entrepreneurs are more likely succeed as they can draw on 
immediately available social capital (Kalnins & Chung, 2006). Metro areas also afford 
access to diverse resources often lacking in rural areas. Metro startups tend to fare better, 
controlling for firm strategy and industry (Stearns, Carter, Reynolds, & Williams, 1995). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs in or near metro areas are less likely to 
disengage from the start-up process than those that are in rural areas. 
 
 The personal characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs likely play a strong role in 
signaling information to outsiders, as these individuals are unlikely to have gone through 
a process of institutionalization (Kimberly, 1979). New ventures started by females 
underperform ventures started by males in measures of size, profitability, and number of 
employees hired (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Firms started by females also have lower 
survival rates, compared to firms started by males (Fairlie & Robb, 2009). 
 29 
 Fairlie and Robb find that minority owned businesses tend to be smaller and less 
successful – specifically they suffer lower sales and fewer employees, according to data 
from the 2006 U.S. Census (2008). Edelman et al. (2010) find that motives differ among 
minority businesses to grow, but not necessarily to start.  
 Education, industry experience, and involvement in prior start-ups may provide 
entrepreneurs access to funding networks that may otherwise not be available, or signal 
lower risk to outside investors (Gartner, et al., In Press). Van Der Sluis et al. find that 
education is not important for selection into entrepreneurship, but it is positively related 
to firm performance on the individual decides to act as an entrepreneur (2008). Robinson 
and Sexton (1994) find that higher education also relates to higher performance. From a 
legitimacy perspective, while industry experience may not be important, start-up 
experience is related to higher performance (Delmar & Shane, 2004). 
 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that individuals do not use more than 1.5 times 
their initial assets to start a new venture. In Thailand, financing seems to be a constraint - 
wealthier households are more likely to start a business, and invest more, compared to 
other households (Paulson & Townsend, 2004). Parker (2004)  posits that high net worth 
individuals are more likely to enter into entrepreneurship for reasons that are not yet 
measureable (e.g. they may be “inherently acquisitive”). 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Male entrepreneurs are less likely to disengage from the 
start-up process than female nascent entrepreneurs. 
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Hypothesis 6b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs are less likely to 
disengage from the start-up process than minority nascent entrepreneurs. 
Hypothesis 6c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher education levels are 
less likely to disengage from the start-up process than those that are less 
educated. 
Hypothesis 6d: Nascent entrepreneurs that have started successful 
businesses in the past are less likely to disengage from the start-up process than 
those who have no prior start-up experience. 
Hypothesis 6e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are less 




 The PSED II, described earlier in this chapter, is used for this analysis. A key 
feature of the PSED II is that it examines the actions of nascent entrepreneurs prior to the 
formation of a new firm. Survivor bias is eliminated, and we can analyze both successful 
and unsuccessful attempts to start a business. 
 Since I am primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses, 
I remove 213 observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent 
entrepreneurs engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II 
questionnaire asks, “Would you describe this new business as an independent new 
business created by an individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of 
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an existing business, a franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business 
sponsored by an existing business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases/takeovers 
of existing businesses, 38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new 
businesses that are sponsored by existing businesses. 
 The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent, new businesses. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The outcome of the nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts to start a business is the 
dependent variable for this analysis. Research on business outcomes has operationalized 
the concept in a number of ways, each with its own drawbacks. Davidsson and Scott 
(2011) describe nascent venture outcomes as including (a) the amount of progress made 
based on actions taken; (b) the individual‟s self-reported status as either having started a 
new firm, disengaged, or still trying; (c) objective measures such as occurrence of first 
sales or positive cash flow, or continuous measures of sales and cash flow. The PSED II 
incorporates both continuous, objective measures of sales and cash flow, as well as the 
individual‟s self-reported status. 
  A “new firm” in the PSED II is defined as, “…an independent commercial actor 
in the economy, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the market” 
(Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). Specifically, a nascent entrepreneur is considered to have 
succeeded if, during six of the previous twelve months, sales have been generated, 
revenue has covered expenses, and wages or salaries have been paid to owners and 
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managers. In addition to these three criteria, the respondent has to confirm that a new 
firm has been created. 
 The dependent variable “OUTCOME” is categorical, and coded as “0” if the 
nascent entrepreneur created a new firm; “1” if still trying as of 2010 (the final wave of 
data collection); and “2” for disengagement. 
 
Independent Variables 
 Level of Financing (FINANCE). FINANCE is a continuous variable representing 
the log of total amount of financing acquired by the nascent entrepreneur between 2005 
and 2010. 
 Firm Size (SIZE). Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements 
best describes your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new 
business to be as large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key 
employees?” SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and 
“1” for a size manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm 
at such an early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the 
number of employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent 
ventures as the business is not yet operational. Therefore, the size expectation of the 
nascent entrepreneur is used as a proxy, albeit an imperfect one. 
 Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the 
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL, 
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited 
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partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or 
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave 
of data collection. 
 Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business 
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is 
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars, 
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution, 
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries 
(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications, 
finance, insurance, and business consulting). 
 Metro Location (METRO). Based on the respondent‟s zip code and categorization 
by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, METRO is coded as “0” if 
the respondent lives in the center city of a metro area, inside a center city county, inside a 
suburban county, or in a general metropolitan area; and “1” if living in a rural area. 
 Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female. 
 Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for 
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races. 
 Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical 
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1” 
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a 
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD, 
PhD, and EDD degrees. 
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 Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a 
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one 
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more. 
 Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions 
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any 
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and 
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets. 
 Time in Process (TIME). Data from the PSED II reveal a high level of variability 
among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in the process of 
creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to ascertain 
when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).  Nascent entrepreneurs 
do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same industry. It is 
possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more the start-up 
attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For example, for each 
month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal entity decreases by 
19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have worked on their 
business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large, representative samples 
as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new firm, or disengaged in the 
same period (Gartner, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004; Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, & 
Gartner, 2007). However, it also stands to reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more 
time working on businesses opportunities that are more complex, or in complex 
industries. To account for this, TIME represents the number of months between the date 
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the individual first started thinking about the business, and the date that the individual 
either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged from the process. For individuals still 
trying during the final wave of data collection, I use (c) the date of the final interview. 
 The time in process, industry, and education variables address issues of sample 
heterogeneity related to samples of nascent ventures (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). 
 
Design 
 Similar to Headd (2003) the categorical dependent variable, OUTCOME, is tested 
using multinomial logistic regression. This model explains the effects of financing, and 
firm and entrepreneur characteristics, on the likelihood of the successful creation of a 
new firm. Logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. This is particularly important when looking at the 
effects of human capital on performance, as prior studies have found linkages using 
nonlinear specifications (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Also, homogeneity of variances 
within each category of the dependent variable is not necessary. 
 The analysis is conducted using population sample weights calculated from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights 








 Table 1.3 shows the number of nascent entrepreneurs within each outcome 
category (the dependent variable). The 102 missing values are part of a group of 
respondents who, shortly after initial screening into the sample, were discovered to have 
either immediately started a profitable firm, or were reactivating a dormant business. In 
other words, these 102 individuals were not creating a new independent business, or they 
were right at the cusp of the creation of a new firm and were captured just as it happened 
(Reynolds & Curtin, 2007a). Overall, missing data rates in the PSED II sample are far 
below the average of any survey of this kind (Reynolds & Curtin, 2009). 
 By the time Wave E interviews were completed in 2010, 14.4% of nascent 
entrepreneurs had created a new firm, 48.3% had disengaged from the process, and 
27.2% were still trying. 
 
  Outcome    | 
  Status     |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-------------+----------------------------------- 
    New Firm |        188       18.78       18.78 
Still Trying |        272       27.17       45.95 
  Disengaged |        439       43.86       89.81 
   (Missing) |        102       10.19      100.00 
-------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,001      100.00 








Financing and Outcome Status 
 Table 1.4 depicts summary statistics for the total amount of financing acquired, 
from all sources, by nascent entrepreneurs in the sample. The distribution is highly 
skewed, with 25% of respondents acquiring less than $1,000. The median amount 
acquired by all entrepreneurs is $5,540, and the average is $114,587. Also presented are 
the four smallest observations ($0), and the four largest – the most money acquired by a 
nascent venture in the PSED II is $27.5 million. 
 
All Firms, Total Financing 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
    Percentiles       Smallest 
 1%          0               0 
 5%          0               0 
10%          0               0      Obs               1,001 
25%      1,000               0      Sum of Wgt.       1,001 
 
50%      5,450                      Mean          114,587.2 
                       Largest      Std. Dev.     1,151,437 
75%     23,750       5,040,000 
90%     80,000       6,100,000      Variance       1.33e+12 
95%    200,000      13,000,000      Skewness       20.64128 
99%  1,993,000      27,500,000      Kurtosis       471.9991 
 
Table 1.4 : Summary Statistics for Total Amount of Financing Acquired by All Firms. 
 
 Table 1.5 shows the amount of financing used by outcome status. The 272 nascent 
entrepreneurs that are still trying up until the final wave of data collection acquire 
$241,596 on average. This is higher than both new firms ($74,177) and disengaged 
($74,063). However, the data is highly skewed, and when we look at median amounts we 
find that new firms acquire $14,000, nascent entrepreneurs still trying acquire $10,000, 
and nascent entrepreneurs that disengage acquired $2,500. 
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 New Firm Still Trying Disengaged 
Median $14,000 $10,000 $2,500 
Mean $74,177 $241,595 $74,063 
 
Table 1.5 : Summary Statistics for Total Financing by Outcome Status 
 
 To determine whether the relation between the amount of financing and the 
nascent entrepreneur‟s outcome is statistically significant, a chi-square test of 
independence is run. Table 1.6 shows the results. The relation between outcomes and the 
amount of financing acquired is significant, χ
2
 (6, N = 1,001) = 64.63, p = .000. 
 
             | Macro-fin.   Average   Non-fin. |     Total 
-------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
    New Firm |        16        153         19 |       188 
             |      8.5%      81.4%      10.1% |      100%  
             |     31.4%      20.7%         9% |     18.8%  
-------------+---------------------------------+----------     
   Still Try |        21        220         31 |       272 
             |      7.7%     80.88%      11.4% |      100%  
             |     41.2%      29.8%      14.6% |     27.1%  
-------------+---------------------------------+----------  
   Disengage |        12        299        128 |       439 
             |      2.7%      68.1%      29.1% |      100%  
             |     23.5%      40.5%      60.3% |     43.9%  
-------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
     Missing |         2         66         34 |       102 
             |        2%      64.7%      33.3% |      100%  
             |      3.9%       8.9%        16% |     10.2%  
-------------+---------------------------------+---------- 
       Total |        51        738        212 |     1,001 
             |      5.1%      73.7%      21.2% |      100%  
             |      100%       100%       100% |      100%  
 
          Pearson chi2(6) =  64.6264   Pr = 0.000 
           Fisher’s exact =                 0.000 
 




 Macro-financers start new firms (31.4%) and disengage (23.5%) at roughly the 
same rate. Among average-financers and non-financers the difference between starting a 
new firm and disengaging is more pronounced – for average-financers, 20.7% start a new 
firm and 40.5% disengage; for non-financers, 9% start a new firm and 60.3% disengage. 
Looking across the “new firm” row, macro-financers and non-financers are getting into 
business at the same rate (8.5% and 10.1%, respectively). 
 
Financing by Source 
 Table 1.7 depicts the frequency and median amount of financing by source for the 
entire PSED II sample. Almost all nascent entrepreneurs (92.4%) use personal savings to 
finance their start-ups. The top sources of external financing are family members 
(18.8%); credit cards (17%); bank loans (12%), and friends (6.4%). Nascent 
entrepreneurs using no money at all make up 18.4% of the sample. Recall that the PSED 
II interview schedule separated the financing items into financing acquired before, and 
after, the respondent registered the business. Median amounts are shown separately in 
Table 1.7, however the number of respondents in the sample that acquired financing is 
small (no more than 10%), so the median values in the third column most closely 


















$0 (No money used) 184 
(18.4%) 
$0 --- 



















Asset Backed Debt 
48 
(4.8%) $37,500 --- 
Bank Line of Credit 
45 
(4.5%) $20,000 --- 
Team Loans 
33 
(3.3%) $10,000 --- 
Leases on Equipment 
31 
(3.1%) $13,500 --- 
Supplier Credit 27 
(2.7%) 
$5,000 --- 
Employee Loans 5 
(.05%) 
$4,000 --- 
SBA Backed Loans 3 
(.03%) 
$55,000 --- 
















 Table 1.8 shows multicollinearity diagnostics for the regression model. Variance 
Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, the recommended cutoff value in logistic regression 
models. Tolerance values are near 1 (Allison, 1999). 
 
  Variable      VIF  Tolerance  
---------------------------------- 
   OUTCOME      1.11    0.8999 
   FINANCE      1.14    0.8804 
      SIZE      1.05    0.9546  
     LEGAL      1.04    0.9605   
  INDUSTRY      1.03    0.9715     
     METRO      1.07    0.9345     
       SEX      1.03    0.9754     
      RACE      1.06    0.9452     
       EDU      1.08    0.9250     
   LOG_EXP      1.07    0.9378     
  NETWORTH      1.06    0.9420     
      TIME      1.04    0.9629     
---------------------------------- 
  Mean VIF      1.06 
 
Table 1.8 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
 
 The multinomial logistic regression in Table 1.9 predicts the likelihood of the 
success or disengagement of nascent entrepreneurs, using the amount of financing, firm 
characteristics, and personal characteristics as predictors. The top numbers represent odds 
ratios, and standard errors are in parentheses. The percent change represents a change in 
odds of the upper outcome over the lower (e.g., new firm vs. disengagement) for 
increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant. 
 Hypothesis 1, that nascent entrepreneurs using more money are less likely to 
disengage, is supported. As the amount of financing increases, the odds a nascent 
 42 
entrepreneur starts a new firm over disengaging increase by 26.2%; and the odds that he 
or she will be still trying after five years increases by 18.5%. 
 Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs expecting to grow the firm as large as 
possible are less likely to disengage, is not supported. In fact, nascent entrepreneurs 
expecting to start firms of a size just big enough to run either alone or with select 
employees are almost twice as likely to get into business. The odds of getting into 
business over disengaging increase by 89% when size expectations are low. 
 Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate are less likely to disengage, 
is not supported. However, nascent entrepreneurs who do not register the venture at all 
(i.e., the venture is not listed as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or corporation), are 
over five times more likely to be still in process, and almost seven times more likely to 
disengage, than successfully start a new firm. The odds of starting a new business over 
disengaging or remaining in process drop by over 80% for these nascent entrepreneurs. 
 Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs in asset intensive industries are less likely to 
disengage, is not supported. 
  Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in metro areas are less likely to disengage, is 
not supported. 
 Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c on sex, race, and education levels, are not supported. 
 Hypothesis 6d, nascent entrepreneurs with prior start-up experience are less likely 
to disengage, is partially supported. The more start-up experience a nascent entrepreneur 
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(.17) 23.4 67.7 -26.4 
Net Worth 1* 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Time 1 1.01*** .991*** 0.4 1.4 -0.9 
(N = 843) 
chi2(df=26) = 120.33; p<0.000 
Pseudo R2 = .1106 
Log pseudo likelihood = -774.6 
a Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower, 
 for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables 
 constant. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05 
 
Table 1.9: Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of Nascent 
Outcomes Based on Amount of Financing 
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 Hypothesis 6e, nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are less likely to 
disengage, is not supported – but the results are interesting. As net worth increases, 
nascent entrepreneurs are equally likely to either start a new business, or disengage from 
the process. 
  While not hypothesized, the results of the control variable, TIME, reveal that as 
the number of months an entrepreneur works on a startup increases, the likelihood of 
starting a new firm or disengaging remains the same. 
 
Discussion 
 Does money matter for successfully starting a business? The results in this 
chapter‟s analysis indicate that it does. While this may seem an obvious conclusion, the 
relationship between financing and a nascent entrepreneur‟s success or failure is 
complex. Nascent entrepreneurs that succeed use a median amount of $14,000 compared 
to a median of $2,500 by those that disengaged. However, the finance data in the PSED II 
is highly skewed, with at least 10% of respondents using no money at all. The average 
amount used by those that succeed and those that disengage is almost exactly the same – 
slightly over $74,000. Consider too that the rates of succeeding and disengaging are the 
same (1) for macro-financers using more than $230,000, and (2) as net worth increases. 
This stands in contrast to formalizations of Knightian concepts of risk where increases in 
wealth lead to higher likelihoods of selection into entrepreneurship (Kihlstrom & Laffont, 
1979). These findings seem to reflect Knightian risk models that account for more than 
just occupational choice (Newman, 2007). Specifically, the findings support the notion 
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that as wealth increases, the risk of exiting entrepreneurship increases because efforts 
toward the start-up need to be justified with higher returns. 
 A high percentage of macro-financers are “still trying” after five years in the 
process of creating a venture. Recall that fewer average- and non-financers are still trying 
after five years. Nascent entrepreneurs using less money are either starting businesses, or 
disengaging. I had assumed that this finding reflected the macro-financers‟ pursuit of 
what must be more complex opportunities that required more time and money. However, 
when I compare the types of businesses started among the three groups of financers, as 
well as whether patents or proprietary technology are used, I find no differences. Two 
possible explanations for these results are: (1) these nascent entrepreneurs are facing 
liabilities associated with large resource endowments outlined by Mosakowski (2002); or 
(2) some of the opportunities pursued by the macro-financers “still trying” are poor 
quality, and the large amounts of financial capital may represent a sunk cost too difficult 
to walk away from. 
 Controlling for personal characteristics of the nascent entrepreneur; certain 
aspects of the venture and industry; and for time spent on the venture - the amount of 
financing does improve the odds of creating a new firm. This supports findings from 
prior studies showing how bank financing correlates to growth and survivability (Cassar, 
2004; Michaelas, et al., 1999). More surprising is the result from the regression model 
showing that, for nascent entrepreneurs desiring to grow their venture as large as 
possible, the odds of starting a new firm drop by 89%. This would indicate that risk is 
connected to intentions (and possibly perceptions) of growth. Indeed, growing too fast 
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can lead to rapid failure if the entrepreneur does not have the resources to support it. Risk 
in this case is about whether the entrepreneur matches the right resources to the right 
opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985). 
 Another interpretation of the finding that high growth aspirations increase the 
likelihood of eventual disengagement from the start-up is that nascent entrepreneurs do 
not accurately perceive their own capabilities. Prior research suggests that the 
entrepreneur‟s perceived capability to acquire resources can either contribute to success, 
or act as a constraint (Brown & Kirchhoff, 1997). Nascent entrepreneurs should get into 
business pursuing opportunities that match their perceived capabilities. If the opportunity 
is outside the range of their own capabilities then they are unlikely to create a new firm. 
In light of this dissertations findings, there may be multiple factors at play: the nascent 
entrepreneur‟s abilities, his motivation, and the size and complexity of the opportunity 
(Chandler & Hanks, 1994). In addition, increases in entrepreneurial self-efficacy (i.e., 
perceiving oneself as capable of starting a business) should be correlated to the ability to 
take advantage of these opportunities (Erikson, 2002; Krueger Jr & Dickson, 1994). 
Future research into the connection between nascent entrepreneurs‟ growth perceptions 
and disengagement might incorporate variables reflecting these constructs to determine 
the extent to which growth perceptions by themselves affect venture outcomes. 
 While nascent entrepreneurs may not accurately gauge their own capabilities, it 
appears that they do rapidly disengage from the process once they realize that taking 
advantage of the opportunity is unlikely (or not valuable). Nascent entrepreneurs that 
disengage use only $2,500 on average, compared to the $14,000 used by those starting 
 47 
new firms. The relationship between more money and increased likelihood of starting a 
new firm may not be dependent on the amount of money, however. Instead it may be that 
bad opportunities (or opportunities that are not matched properly to capabilities) are 
found out early and get less money associated with them because they are not pursued. 
Good opportunities, or well matched opportunities, are pursued and get more money. 
 Not unsurprisingly, nascent entrepreneurs that never legally register their nascent 
venture as a sole-proprietorship, partnership, or some form of corporation, rarely start a 
new firm. It is possible for a nascent entrepreneur to start a new firm without formally 
registering, because the operational definition of a new firm in this dissertation is, “an 
independent commercial actor, affecting the prices and quantities of goods traded in the 
market” (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). However, cases of non-registered new firms are rare 
in the PSED II. Research on the sequence of actions during the start-up process might 
explain why the majority of new firms are also registered, but I suspect that new firms are 
overrepresented among registered firms in the sample. If, for example, the act of 
registering the firm takes a considerable amount of time, effort, and resources (Gartner, et 
al., In Press), then it is likely that firm registration will take place much later in the 
sequence of actions lead to the creation of a firm. Nascent entrepreneurs that disengage 
will do so before they need to register, resulting in the overrepresentation of new firms. 
 Perhaps the most interesting result is in Table 1.6. Macro-financers and non-
financers start new firms at almost exactly the same rate. I stated in this chapter that more 
money increases the odds of starting a new firm, but this gives the impression that giving 
entrepreneurs more money will increase the rate of new firms entering the economy. 
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Instead, it may be more accurate to say that no money decreases the odds of starting a 
new firm. What this means for policymakers is that if the goal is to create new firms, then 
perhaps this can be done with a lot less money. However, if the goal is to encourage and 
support certain types of firms, then we need to investigate the macro-financing and non-
financing groups more closely to see what types of new firms are being created. I address 
this topic in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ACQUIRING FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO FORM NEW VENTURES: 




 The “pecking order theory” of financing says that firms and individuals will use 
personal funds before acquiring external debt and equity. This theory has been applied to 
the study of established firms, but it is not clear whether entrepreneurs follow a pecking 
order when financing their start-ups. This study investigates the types of financial 
resources acquired over time, by individuals in the process of creating a new venture. It 
uses data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II to investigate the 
relationship between sources of funding and characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur. 
Results indicate that entrepreneurs may follow a pecking order when financing. However, 
contrary to many studies on entrepreneurial financing, individual characteristics affect 
financing decisions as well. 
 
Introduction 
 The focus of this dissertation is on the nascent entrepreneur, and the actions he or 
she takes to create an organization (Gartner, 1988). Acquiring financial resources is one 
of the principal actions that entrepreneurs undertake, yet nearly all research on business 
financing has focused on established firms (Åstebro & Bernhardt, 2003; Chaganti, et al., 
1995; Ou & Haynes, 2006; Verheul & Thurik, 2001). Understanding how entrepreneurs 
use and acquire financial resources during the nascent stage is critical to our 
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understanding of who bears the risks of entrepreneurship (i.e., the entrepreneur, or the 
financier). 
 Pecking Order Theory (POT) states that business owners and entrepreneurs first 
use internal financing, followed by external debt and equity, in an effort to maintain 
maximum control over the business, and to avoid costs resulting from information 
asymmetries (Berger & Udell, 2003; Myers, 1984). Information asymmetries arise when 
the entrepreneur has more information on the value of a business opportunity than the 
financiers. Theoretically, financiers will account for this uncertainty and include it in the 
cost of the capital provided. Entrepreneurs will attempt to avoid these costs by first 
financing the venture internally. 
 POT was originally devised to examine the financing of large corporations, but it 
has also been applied to small and medium-sized businesses. This chapter examines the 
entrepreneur‟s acquisition of financing at the earliest stages of a firm‟s creation. 
Specifically, it explores how progression through the venture creation process affects the 
acquisition of financial resources, and whether nascent entrepreneurs actually follow a 
pecking order. 
 Using theory from research on the sources of funding for new ventures (Cassar, 
2004; Gartner, et al., In Press) and on pecking order and small firm financing (Cosh & 
Hughes, 1994; Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2006; Holmes & Kent, 1991; Lopez-Gracia & 
Aybar-Arias, 2000; Zoppa & McMahon, 2002), I offer a set of hypotheses about the 
sources of financing that nascent entrepreneurs pursue. 
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 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: First, a theoretical background 
on small firm financing and pecking order theory is provided. Second, hypotheses are 
presented on whether certain characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur affect how 
financial resources are acquired over time. Third, the dataset, variables, and research 
design are described. Fourth, results of the data analysis are presented. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
 Until the 1990s, the majority of finance studies focused on large corporations and 
publicly traded companies. Scholars then turned attention toward small firms since they 
differ considerably from larger firms (Ang, 1991). Small and medium-sized businesses 
face different agency and information asymmetry challenges, as they are not likely to be 
publically traded or incorporated. This limits the sources of financing available to them, 
and, because they are not required to share as much information as public companies, 
they are information opaque (1991). Financing decisions for small ventures may also be 
more complex because they are closely linked to the personal wealth or contacts of the 
owner/manager. Consequently, agency problems may be more intense as shareholders 
and partners are often made up of family and friends (Ang, 1992). 
The pecking order theory of firm financing may explain how entrepreneurs 
address these agency problems. According to this theory, individuals do not aim for a 
target debt ratio. Instead, they select from funding sources that minimize the cost of 
capital (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In the case of the small firm or 
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entrepreneur, personal sources are used first, followed by external debt, and then outside 
equity. Equity is acquired last because the entrepreneur presumably has more information 
than the investor. The presence of significant information asymmetries causes the 
investor to charge a higher rate of return on equity than on debt (Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
Indeed, information asymmetry costs may be much higher for small firms than for large, 
and the pecking order framework may explain a great deal of financing behavior by 
entrepreneurs (Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2000; Scherr, et al., 1993). 
 To the extent that information asymmetries increase the cost of capital the smaller 
(and younger) the firm, entrepreneurs should engage in a “pecking order” financing 
strategy. If financiers increase the cost of capital such that it drives entrepreneurs toward 
using more personalized sources of money, then it represents a significant resource 
barrier for nascent entrepreneur to overcome. It also calls into question who shoulders the 
risk of entrepreneurship. If entrepreneurs use their own money first, then the Knightian 
view of entrepreneur as uncertainty-bearer is supported. 
 This chapter examines this issue using the PSED II, a sample of individuals in the 
process of creating a business. Because the cases in the PSED II represent attempts at 
creating a new venture, captured at the earliest stage of the process, the nature of personal 
funds, debt, and equity may differ from the traditional sense. Debt and equity in a smaller 
firm are more likely related to the owner‟s attitudes toward risk, or the availability of any 
source of money (i.e., taking what one can get), than any formal capital structuring policy 
(Levin & Travis, 1987). Modification of pecking order theory to better reflect the 
circumstances of small firms may be necessary (Zoppa & McMahon, 2002). 
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 Reynolds (2011) categorizes financing sources from the PSED II into formal and 
informal sources of financing based on whether the nascent venture is registered as a 
legal entity. Certain types of financing, such as a working capital loan or bank line of 
credit, are not available to entrepreneurs until the business is legally registered. 
Therefore, in this analysis, I create three categories of financing: personal funds only; 
external informal funds; and external formal funds. These categories represent a modified 
pecking order of the acquisition of financial resources. Based on this modified pecking 
order, I develop hypotheses about how nascent entrepreneurs acquire financing during the 
venture creation process, taking into consideration characteristics of the firm, industry, 
and individual. Clearly, the main component of pecking order theory is time. According 
to the theory, entrepreneurs should use personal funds first. As time goes by they should 
use more and more informal and formal sources of financing. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nascent entrepreneurs will more likely use personal funds early in 
the venture creation process. As time goes by, they will more likely use external 
informal and formal financing. 
 
 The entrepreneur‟s expectations of the future size of the business will 
significantly influence whether personal and external sources of outside funds are 
acquired during the start-up process. Smaller companies should require less capital. Also, 
the cost to access certain kinds of funding may decline the larger the firm. Ang (1992) 
finds that the high transaction costs faced by small businesses in securing outside 
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financing may preclude some sources of funding. Cosh and Hughes (1994) and Cassar 
(2004) find that smaller firms use relatively less outside financing. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that expected to start large businesses will 
more likely acquire external informal and formal funds than nascent ventures that 
are expected to be smaller in size. 
 
 Financial institutions and venture capitalists may consider the form of 
incorporation to be a signal of credibility. Prior evidence by Coleman and Cohn (2000), 
and Cassar (2004) suggest a positive relationship between incorporation and leverage 
and/or bank financing. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate will more likely acquire 
external informal and formal funds than nascent ventures that are 
unincorporated. 
 
 My categorization of financing into personal and external sources assumes that 
the entrepreneur will be required to put in more effort (e.g. preparation of a business plan 
and financial projections, and legally registering the firm) when seeking external funds. It 
also assumes that providers of these funds will require this type of information to closely 
monitor the start-up‟s performance.  There is some debate as to the relation between 
formal business planning and start-up performance. Honig and Karlsson find no positive 
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outcomes associated with business planning (2004), while others find that business 
planning is essential and prevents early disbanding (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Preparation 
of financial statements, a form of business planning, may be critical, however, for nascent 
entrepreneurs. Specifically, financial planning affords a measure of strategic legitimacy 
and has been linked to organizational emergence (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007).  
 
Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections 
will more likely acquire external informal and formal funds than nascent 
entrepreneurs that did not create financial projections. 
 
 Start-ups in more asset-intensive industries such as mining, manufacturing, and 
construction, would be expected to require larger capital outlays early-on compared to 
start-ups in service industries such as consulting, financial services, and consumer 
services. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Nascent entrepreneurs in asset-intensive industries will more likely 
acquire external sources of financing than nascent ventures in service-oriented 
industries. 
 
 Characteristics of the entrepreneur may affect access to funding. For example, 
education and start-up experience may provide entrepreneurs access to funding networks 
that may otherwise not be available, or signal lower risk to outside investors. Verheul and 
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Thurik (2001) and Haynes and Haynes (1999) find that gender has no influence on the 
likelihood of getting a loan, whereas Carter and Rose (1998) find that women tend to use 
less institutional finance. Bates (1990) finds that owner educational background is a 
major determinant of the capital structure of small firms. Coleman and Cohn (2000) find 
that education is positively related to acquiring external loans. Findings on the effects of 
the personal wealth of the nascent entrepreneur on funding choice are mixed. Avery et al.  
find (1998) that the majority of small business loans are backed by personal 
commitments made by the entrepreneur. Cassar (2004) found that once firm 
characteristics were taken into consideration, the characteristics of the business owner do 
not affect the financing of the firm. 
 
 H6a: Male nascent entrepreneurs will more likely acquire external 
informal and formal financing compared to females. 
 H6b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs will more likely acquire 
external informal and formal financing compared to minorities. 
 H6c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher levels of education will more 
likely acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent 
entrepreneurs with low levels of education. 
 H6d: Nascent entrepreneurs with more start-up experience will more 
likely acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent 
entrepreneurs with little industry experience. 
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 H6e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth will more likely 
acquire external informal and formal financing compared to nascent 




 This analysis uses data from the PSED II to investigate nascent entrepreneur 
financing. The PSED II is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of 1,214 
nascent entrepreneurs in the United States. As of this writing, five waves of data have 
been collected (between 2005 and 2010). All five waves are used in the analyses in this 
dissertation. 
  Appendix A describes the screening process for identifying nascent 
entrepreneurs. It also provides information on the PSED research program, rationale, and 
interview schedules. 
 All analyses are conducted using population sample weights calculated from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights 
based on the number of removed observations and final sample size N. Since I am 
primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses, I remove 213 
observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent entrepreneurs 
engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II questionnaire asks, 
“Would you describe this new business as an independent new business created by an 
individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of an existing business, a 
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franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business sponsored by an existing 
business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases or takeovers of existing businesses, 
38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new businesses that are 
sponsored by existing businesses. The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent, 
new businesses. 
 Chapter 1 described the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. Sections 
Q and R contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by respondents. Certain 
types of funding require that the business be formally established by registering with an 
appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources acquired before 
registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Personal only, external-informal, and external-formal. The three categories of 
financing for the dependent variable are coded as: “0” for the use of only personal 
sources, “1” for external, informal sources, and “2” for external, formal sources. These 
categories represent a modified pecking order of the acquisition of financial resources for 
a nascent venture. Table 2.1 lists the different sources of financing from the PSED II 
questionnaire, and illustrates how the different items were combined to construct the 
dependent variable (Reynolds, 2011). Personal sources reflect financing that can be 
acquired and used at the discretion of the entrepreneur or the start-up team. Note that 
credit cards and 2
nd
 mortgages are considered “personal” in this study. The theoretical 
underpinnings to pecking order theory are risk bearing and information asymmetries.  
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  Source of        |  Personal     External    External 
   Financing        |    Only       Informal     Formal 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 Personal Savings         X 
 Credit card loans        X 
 Asset backed loan        X 
 Personal loans           X 
 Loans from team          X 
 
 Family loans                         X 
 Friends, employers,                  X 
 Spouses, family,                     X 
 Employees                            X 
 Loans from others                    X 
 Other pre-register                   X 
 
 Bank loan           X 
 Asset backed debts          X 
 Leases on property             X 
 Bank line of credit,             X 
 Supplier credit         X 
 Venture Capital         X 
 Government agency         X 
 SBA guaranteed loans             X 
 Other post-register         X 
Table 2.1 : Dependent Variable Construction from Funding Sources in PSED II. 
 
 Money from credit cards is not considered external since the financier is not 
monitoring how the money is used. Nor is the risk and uncertainty associated with the 
business opportunity calculated into the cost of capital. A credit card will cost what it 
costs, regardless of how the entrepreneur uses the money. Personal savings; credit card 
loans; asset backed loans such as those coming from a 2
nd
 mortgage; and other personal 
and team loans all qualify as personal, internal funds. 
 The categorization of financing sources in this chapter also reflects a proposed 
“alternate pecking order” where early stage ventures use sweat equity first, followed by 
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credit cards and team loans; family and friends; banks; and finally equity (Zoppa & 
McMahon, 2002). 
 External-informal sources include money acquired from family and friends; work 
colleagues; employees; loans from other individuals; as well as sources classified by the 
respondent as “other” (as long as the money was acquired prior to legal registration of the 
business). External-formal sources include bank loans; asset backed debts and leases after 
legal registration of the firm; bank lines of credit and working capital; supplier credit; 




 Passage of Time (WAVE). The passage of time during which financial resources 
are acquired is calculated by observing the number of interview waves the respondent 
participated in. Data is collected across five waves. Individuals who either started a new 
firm or abandoned the process at Wave B are coded “0”; Wave C “1”; Wave D “2”; 
Wave E “3”. Individuals still trying throughout all five waves are coded as “4”. 
 Firm Size (SIZE). Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements 
best describes your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new 
business to be as large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key 
employees?” SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and 
“1” for a size manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm 
at such an early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the 
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number of employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent 
ventures as the business is not yet operational. Therefore, the growth expectation of the 
nascent entrepreneur is used as a proxy, albeit an imperfect one. 
 Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the 
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL, 
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited 
partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or 
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave 
of data collection. 
 Financial Planning (PLAN). Item D26 in the questionnaire asks respondents, 
“Have financial projection, such as income or cash flow statements or break-even 
analyses, been developed, will financial projections be developed in the future, or is this 
not relevant for the new business?” PLAN is coded “0” if no formal financial took place 
during the start-up process; and “1” if the nascent entrepreneur undertook some form of 
formalized financial planning. 
 Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business 
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is 
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars, 
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution, 
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries 
(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications, 
finance, insurance, and business consulting). 
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 Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female. 
 Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for 
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races. 
 Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical 
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1” 
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a 
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD, 
PhD, and EDD degrees. 
 Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a 
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one 
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more. 
 Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions 
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any 
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and 
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets. 
 Time in Process (TIME). Data from the PSED II reveal a high level of variability 
among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in the process of 
creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to ascertain 
when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).  Nascent entrepreneurs 
do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same industry. It is 
possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more the start-up 
attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For example, for each 
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month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal entity decreases by 
19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have worked on their 
business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large, representative samples 
as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new firm, or disengaged in the 
same period (Gartner, et al., 2004; Lichtenstein, et al., 2007). However, it also stands to 
reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more time working on businesses opportunities 
that are more complex, or in complex industries. To account for this, TIME represents the 
number of months between the date the individual first started thinking about the 
business, and the date that the individual either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged 
from the process. For individuals still trying during the final wave of data collection, I 
use (c) the date of the final interview. 
 
Research Design 
 Similar to Headd (2003) and Cassar (2004) the categorical dependent variable, 
MONEY, is tested using multinomial logistic regression. This model explains the effects 
of time, as well as characteristics of the start-up and the entrepreneur, on the likelihood of 
acquiring external sources of funding at later stages in the start-up process. Logistic 
regression does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. This is particularly important when looking at the effects of human capital on 
performance, as prior studies have found linkages using nonlinear specifications 
(Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). Also, homogeneity of variances within each category of 
the dependent variable is not necessary. 
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 The analysis is conducted using population sample weights calculated from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights 




 Table 2.2 shows the number of respondents within each category of the dependent 
variable. Respondents using only some form of personal funding, without any external 
funds, make up 65.6% of the sample. Informal external funds are used by 15.3%, and 
formal external funds are used by 19%. Table 2.3 below depicts multicollinearity 
diagnostic statistics for the regression model. Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5 
(the recommended cutoff value in logistic regression models), and Tolerance values are 
near 1 (Allison, 1999).  
 
      MONEY |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
   Personal |        657       65.63       65.63 
   Informal |        154       15.38       81.02 
     Formal |        190       18.98      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,001      100.00  
 










  Variable      VIF  Tolerance  
---------------------------------- 
     MONEY      1.10    0.9090 
      WAVE      1.21    0.8240 
      SIZE      1.05    0.9512  
     LEGAL      1.03    0.9749   
      PLAN      1.08    0.9287     
  INDUSTRY      1.03    0.9726     
       SEX      1.02    0.9799     
      RACE      1.02    0.9653     
       EDU      1.04    0.9479     
   LOG_EXP      1.08    0.9295     
  NETWORTH      1.05    0.9484     
      TIME      1.19    0.8427     
---------------------------------- 
  Mean VIF      1.08 
 
Table 2.3 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
 
Analysis 
 The multinomial logistic regression in Table 2.4 predicts the likelihood of the use 
of personal or external funding, using time in process, firm characteristics, and 
entrepreneur characteristics as predictors. The top numbers represent odds ratios, and 
standard errors are in parentheses. The percent change represents a change in odds of the 
upper outcome over the lower (e.g., new firm vs. disengagement) for increases in the 
independent variable, holding all other variables constant. 
 Hypothesis 1, that nascent entrepreneurs will more likely use external informal 
and formal sources of financing as time goes on, is partially supported. Nascent 
entrepreneurs that are at least five years into the creation of a new venture are more than 
twice as likely to use formal sources of finance compared to earlier in the process. The 
odds of using formal financing increase 131%. 
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 Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs that expect to start a large business will more 
likely acquire external informal and formal funding, is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their start-up will more 
likely acquire external informal and formal funding, is supported. Nascent entrepreneurs 
of incorporated nascent ventures are 3.5 times more likely to acquire formal financing 
than use personal money alone. The odds of acquiring informal financing increase 88%, 
and the odds of acquiring formal financing increase 247%, compared to sole-
proprietorships or general partnerships. For entrepreneurs that do not register their firm at 
all, the odds of using informal financing over formal increase 468%. 
 Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections will 
more likely acquire external informal and formal financing, is supported. The odds of 
non-planners using informal financing drops 45% compared to planners, while the odds 
of non-planners using formal financing drops 51%.  
 Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in asset intensive industries will more likely 
acquire external informal and formal financing, is supported. The odds of nascent 
entrepreneurs in service-related industries using formal financing drop 35.7% compared 
to those in asset intensive industries. 
 Hypotheses 6a and 6b are supported. The odds of females using formal financing 
are 44.5% less than males. Minorities are twice as likely to use informal-external sources 
over personal sources, compared to non-minorities; and they are almost 3 times more 
likely to use informal-external sources over formal-external sources. 
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 Multinomial Logit 
Estimatesa 
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47.0 44.2 1.9 
Net Worth 1 1* 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Time .997 1 .996 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 
(N = 843) 
chi2(df=26) = 125.67; p<0.000 
Pseudo R2 = .1167 
Log pseudo likelihood = -680.7 
a Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower, 
 for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables 
 constant. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05 
 
Table 2.4: Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of the Use of 
Personal, Informal, and Formal Financing Based on Time in Process. 
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 Hypotheses 6c and 6d, on education levels and prior start-up experience, were not 
supported. Hypotheses 6e, nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth will more likely 
acquire informal and formal funds, is not supported. However, as net worth increases, the 
odds of using formal-external funds versus personal funds remain the same. 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with prior research on pecking order theory among small and medium-
sized businesses, the results in this chapter indicate that nascent entrepreneurs seem to 
use personal funds as the sole source of financing early in the venture creation process. 
As time goes on, the likelihood of acquiring formal-external sources increases. Two-
thirds of all nascent entrepreneurs use only personal sources of financing. They do not 
acquire any external sources of funds during the venture creation process. Those who do 
use external-formal sources of financing from banks and other financial institutions are 
much more likely to do so very late in the process. 
 Interestingly, external-formal sources of funding from banks and other financial 
institutions are more commonly used than external-informal sources such as friends and 
family. Here again we see the conventional wisdom of “friends, family, and fools” being 
challenged – assuming that this sequence reflects the order in which each source is most 
commonly used. Despite the prevalence of formal sources of financing, females and 
minorities are much less likely to acquire it. This echoes findings in a number of other 
studies that show minorities often face credit-constraints, such as not having access to 
bank loans (Bates, 1985; Black & Strahan, 2002; Fairlie & Meyer, 1999). The result that 
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minorities are much more likely to use informal sources of financing over both personal 
and formal sources can be linked to a stream of research investigating “ethnic enclaves”. 
An enclave consists of “…immigrant groups which concentrate in a distinct spatial 
location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market…” (Portes, 
1981; Sanders & Nee, 1987). The minority entrepreneurs in the PSED II are acquiring a 
large portion of financing from friends and family. This finding may also be an indication 
of “informal economies” within the United States. An informal economy “…comprises 
economic actions that bypass the costs of, and are excluded from the protection of, laws 
and administrative rules covering „property relationships, commercial licensing, financial 
credit, [etc.]…‟” (Feige, 1990; Portes & Haller, 2005). Entrepreneurial effort is thought 
of in terms of the community, and involvement may be shared with others in the form of 
financial investments. 
 Personal characteristics, such as race and sex, do appear to affect a nascent 
entrepreneur‟s financing behavior. Other studies on start-up financing have found that the 
characteristics of the principal decision-maker are not significant (Cassar, 2004). This 
may be a function of the data used in the analysis. While other studies have analyzed the 
venture creation process as far back as within a few months of the legal registration of the 
business, the PSED II pushes this limit even further. The PSED II investigated the 
venture‟s gestation period. Again, if legal registration of the business is one of the last 
acts nascent entrepreneurs perform; it would explain why prior studies only find industry 
and firm factors to be of influence. Other personal characteristics affecting the acquisition 
of funds in this chapter include financial planning, and net worth. Nascent entrepreneurs 
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that develop formal financial plans are more likely to acquire formal financing. This is of 
no surprise as formal sources such as banks will require financial projections. As the 
individual‟s net worth increases, the odds of using either formal financing or only 
personal money remain the same. This supports Knightian views on risk and uncertainty, 
as well as pecking order theory. Wealthy nascent entrepreneurs will use their own money 
to keep control of the venture and to keep capital costs low, while bearing the risk in the 
process. 
 Nascent entrepreneurs acting in asset-intensive industries and incorporating their 
start-ups are likely to use formal funds. This is consistent with prior research as well 
(Cassar, 2004; Coleman & Chon, 2000). 
 A potential drawback to this study is that the financial variables for each source of 
finding in the PSED II are not operationalized according to debt and equity – a core 
premise of pecking order theory. In the PSED I, respondents are asked (for each source of 
funding) whether the money was received with the expectation that it would be paid back 
with interest (debt), or whether it was received with the expectation that the financier 
would own part of the firm (equity). Another study finds that a clear and pronounced 
pecking order does occur in the PSED I sample (Frid, 2009). Although the analysis in this 
chapter took steps to reflect an “alternative pecking order” as proposed by Zoppa and 
McMahon (2002) (credit cards, loans from owners, friends and family, bank, equity), the 
results may actually reflect the acquisition of external informal and formal financing. 
 While it may seem obvious that entrepreneurs will use resources that are less 
costly (and easier) to obtain, recall the Schumpeterian assumption that entrepreneurs get 
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others to bear the risks of pursuing opportunities. The results in this chapter suggest that 
it is the entrepreneur who bears the initial risks first, before external financiers are sought 
out. An alternative explanation is that the nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II sample 
are more likely to use resources that are close at hand, lending support to “bricolage” 
theory (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Bricolage describes the process of starting a business 
within a resource-poor environment. Nascent entrepreneurs will use resources at hand 
rather than procuring them externally. The next two chapters investigate financing by 
resource-rich and resource-poor nascent entrepreneurs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 




 This chapter examines 51 nascent entrepreneurs that used between $230,000 and 
$27.5 million during the venture creation process. These 51 cases represent the 95
th
 
percentile of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States, as measured by the amount of 
financing acquired. Nascent entrepreneurs in this category are labeled high potential, 
“macro-financers” as they reside in the extreme tail of the distribution. Macro-financers 
are rare individuals that drive much of the financing activity among nascent start-ups. 
Industry, incorporation, and financial planning on the part of the entrepreneur affect the 
likelihood that these individuals have this impact. However, characteristics of the 
individual such as race, sex, education, and experience are not significant. 
 
Introduction 
 New venture creation is an important driver of both job growth and innovation in 
the U.S. economy (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Birch, 1979). Recently, scholars have 
become increasingly interest in the importance of these “high impact” firms (Acs, 
Parsons, & Tracy, 2008). These firms are few in number, yet they create a 
disproportionate number of jobs and make greater contributions to GDP. While these rare 
firms have attracted the attention of academic researchers and the popular press (e.g., in 
popular books such as “In Search of Excellence”, “Built to Last”, and “Good to Great”), 
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far less is known about successful performance and growth among nascent enterprises, 
their distribution, and impact on the economy. 
 This chapter attempts to identify characteristics of macro-financers and their start-
up attempts. We would assume that nascent entrepreneurs using such vast amounts of 
financing are pursuing high-value opportunities. Traditional measures of superior 
performance will not work for these nascent entrepreneurs because they are still in the 
gestation process. Therefore, I investigate characteristics of the individual, firm, and 
environment that might affect the likelihood that he or she me a macro-financer. 
 I begin by examining how firm performance has been analyzed and measured by 
management and entrepreneurship scholars. I then offer a series of hypotheses that 
investigate characteristics of high-potential nascent ventures. 
 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
 Scholars interested in firms and individuals that significantly outperform 
competitors have defined the concept of high-performance in a number of ways. The four 
principal terms in the management and entrepreneurship literature are gazelles, high-
impact, high-potential, and high (or superior) performance. The “gazelle” firm is likely 
the most familiar. Gazelles are young, small firms that, despite their size, grow rapidly in 
revenues and account for much of the job creation in the economy (Birch, 1979). Related 
to the gazelle is the “high-impact” firm. Acs, et al. (2008) explicitly defines high impact 
firms as enterprises that double their sales growth over a four year period and generate an 
employment growth quantifier greater than two. They find that 376,605 firms met these 
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requirements from 2002-2006. The average age of these firms is older than expected (25 
years old), though high-impact firms might be of any age. They are also rare, comprising 
only 2-3% of all firms. While “growth” is inherent to both terms, studies on gazelles and 
high-impact firms tend to be concerned with issues that are broad in scope, such as 
macroeconomic conditions, job creation, and economic development. 
 The remaining two terms, high performance and high potential, are closely 
related. Carton and Hofer (2006) review how firm performance has been measured by 
management scholars. Financial measures may be the most widely used measures of 
performance. Subjective measures such as ROA and sales growth have been found to be 
reliable as performance measures when objective measures are not available; as have 
more complex measures such as the Q ratio, which is the value of individual business 
units divided by the purchase cost of assets (Callard & Klein, 1985; Dess & Robinson, 
1984). 
 Brush and VanderWerf (1992) find that among studies on entrepreneurship, 35 
different measures of performance are used, the most frequent being changes in sales, 
organizational survival, and changes in the number of employees. Markman & Gartner 
(2002) operationalize firm growth in terms of both sales and employees and find that 
among the fastest growing firms on the Inc. 500 list, young firms experience higher 
profitability rates. By examining these measures across other dimensions – such as 
absolute growth (annual change in numbers of employees or sales) versus relative growth 
(annual percentage changes) versus organic growth (total growth minus new acquisition 
growth) – researchers can better account for heterogeneity in the ways that firms grow. It 
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is also known that different forms of growth are related to characteristics of the firm and 
external environment (e.g., age, size, and industry) (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 
2003). 
 The concept of high potential firms has most recently attracted the attention of 
researchers at the Queensland University of Technology. A portion of the Comprehensive 
Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) on new venture creation in 
Australia identifies high potential firms using measures of human capital (the experience 
and education of the entrepreneur), and whether high technology is an integral part of the 
fledgling firm. 
 Henderson, Raynor, & Ahmed (2009) investigate “superior performers”, which 
they define as firms that have consistently performed in the top 10% of ROA across the 
firm‟s observed life. The objective of their study is to statistically differentiate between 
firms that merit the label of superior performer, and those that are merely the result of a 
random walk. They investigate superior performers using a non-distributional approach 
that does not rely on systematically identifying high-performing firms. Instead, they base 
their selection on actual evidence of superior performance (i.e., firms consistently in the 
top 10% of ROA). 
 The approach I use to investigate nascent entrepreneurs in this chapter is a hybrid 
of the “high-potential” characteristics used in other studies, and the “superior 
performance” non-distributional approach by Henderson, et al. (2009). I select start-ups 
in the 95
th
 percentile of a nationally representative sample. Using the amount of funding 
acquired by the nascent entrepreneur, I find that only 5% of the sample accounts for 95% 
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of all financing in the United States from 2005 – 2010. These are the “macro-financers”, 
or rare individuals that drive much of the activity among nascent start-ups. 
 Studies investigating the process of creating a new venture often reveal a high 
level of variability among respondents, specifically regarding the amount of time spent in 
the process of creating a new venture. This “temporal heterogeneity” makes it difficult to 
ascertain when, exactly, the process begins (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011).  Nascent 
entrepreneurs do not form new ventures at the same rate, not even within the same 
industry. It is possible that the longer an individual works on his or her business, the more 
the start-up attempt will differ compared to others that started at the same time. For 
example, for each month a new firm ages, the hazard of establishing itself as a legal 
entity decreases by 19% (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Also, nascent entrepreneurs that have 
worked on their business longer than 12 months may be over represented in large, 
representative samples as members of their initial cohort will have either started a new 
firm, or disengaged in the same period (Gartner, et al., 2004; Lichtenstein, et al., 2007). 
However, it also stands to reason that nascent entrepreneurs spend more time working on 
businesses opportunities that are more complex, or in complex industries. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The longer a nascent entrepreneur acts to create a new business, 
the more likely he or she will be a macro-financer. 
 
 Many institutions consider incorporation to be a signal of credibility and 
operational quality (Gartner, et al., In Press). Legal planning and the process of 
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incorporating a business has been found to better protect the assets of the business and 
entrepreneur, and to familiarize the entrepreneur with regulatory regimes relevant to the 
start-up (Malach, et al., 2006). If true for nascent entrepreneurs, one would expect a 
higher likelihood of the formation of a new firm.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are 
more likely to be macro-financers. 
 
 There is some debate as to the relation between formal business planning and 
start-up performance. Honig and Karlsson find no positive outcomes associated with 
business planning (2004), while others find that business planning is essential and 
prevents early disbanding (Delmar & Shane, 2004). Preparation of financial statements, a 
form of business planning, may be critical, however, for nascent entrepreneurs. 
Specifically, financial planning affords a measure of strategic legitimacy and has been 
linked to organizational emergence (Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007).  
 
Hypothesis 3: Nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections 
will more likely become macro-financers. 
 
 A recent study of young Swedish firms has found that industry level matters little 
for performance measures such as survival, sales, and sales growth (Short, et al., 2009). I 
surmise, however, that nascent entrepreneurs face more complexity when attempting to 
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start businesses in industries that are more asset intensive, such as mining, 
manufacturing, and construction. Larger capital outlays are required early in the venture 
creation process, compared to service industries such as consulting, financial services, 
and consumer services (Gartner, et al., In Press). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive 
industries will more likely become macro-financers. 
 
 Nascent entrepreneurs may benefit depending on their location. Concentrations of 
people and businesses enable sharing of culture and resources, as well as providing 
access to specialized knowledge (Plummer & Pe‟er, 2010). Firms located in strong 
clusters have been linked to higher rates of survival and performance (Wennberg & 
Lindqvist, 2010). Within metro areas, immigrant entrepreneurial efforts are more likely to 
survive as they can draw on immediately available social capital (Kalnins & Chung, 
2006). Metro areas also afford access to diverse resources often lacking in rural areas, 
and it has been shown that metro startups tend to fare better, controlling for firm strategy 
and industry (Stearns, et al., 1995). 
 




 The use of patents or proprietary technology has been used as an indicator of a 
firm‟s high potential; perhaps most notably by the CAUSEE research initiative that 
includes an oversampling of high potential nascent ventures in Australia. I surmise that 
nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses involving the use of proprietary technology are 
likely to raise more money and need more employees at an early stage (if successful). 
 
Hypothesis 6: Nascent entrepreneurs creating businesses centered on proprietary 
technology will more likely become macro-financers. 
 
 Nascent ventures are unlikely to have gone through a process of 
institutionalization, so it is likely that personal characteristics play a strong role in 
signaling information to outsiders (Kimberly, 1979). New ventures started by females 
still underperform ventures started by males in measures of size, profitability, and 
number of employees hired (Robb & Coleman, 2009). Firms started by females also have 
lower survival rates, compared to firms started by males (Fairlie & Robb, 2009). 
 Fairlie and Robb find that minority owned businesses tend to be smaller and less 
successful – specifically they suffer lower sales and fewer employees, according to data 
from the 2006 U.S. Census (2008). Edelman et al. (2010) find that motives differ among 
minority businesses to grow, but not necessarily to start.  
 Education, industry experience, and involvement in prior start-ups may provide 
entrepreneurs access to funding networks that may otherwise not be available, or signal 
lower risk to outside investors (Gartner, et al., In Press). Van Der Sluis et al. find that 
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education is not important for selection into entrepreneurship, but it is positively related 
to firm performance on the individual decides to act as an entrepreneur (2008). Robinson 
and Sexton (1994) find that higher education also relates to higher performance. From a 
legitimacy perspective, while industry experience may not be important, start-up 
experience is related to higher performance (Delmar & Shane, 2004). 
 Evans and Jovanovic (1989) find that individuals do not use more than 1.5 times 
their initial assets to start a new venture. In Thailand, financing seems to be a constraint - 
wealthier households are more likely to start a business and invest more in their 
businesses compared to other households (Paulson & Townsend, 2004). Parker (2004)  
posits that high net worth individuals are be more likely to enter into entrepreneurship for 
reasons that are not yet measureable (e.g. they may be “inherently acquisitive”). 
 
 Hypothesis 7a: Male entrepreneurs are more likely to be macro-financers 
than female nascent entrepreneurs. 
 Hypothesis 7b: Non-minority nascent entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
macro-financers than minority nascent entrepreneurs. 
 Hypothesis 7c: Nascent entrepreneurs with higher education levels are 
more likely to be macro-financers than those that are less educated. 
 Hypothesis 7d: Nascent entrepreneurs that have started successful 
businesses in the past are more likely to be macro-financers than those who have 
no prior start-up experience. 
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 Hypothesis 7e: Nascent entrepreneurs with a higher net worth are more 




 This analysis uses data from the PSED II to investigate nascent entrepreneur 
financing. The PSED II is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of 1,214 
nascent entrepreneurs in the United States. As of this writing, five waves of data have 
been collected (between 2005 and 2010). All five waves are used in the analyses in this 
dissertation. 
  Appendix A describes the screening process for identifying nascent 
entrepreneurs. It also provides information on the PSED research program, rationale, and 
interview schedules. 
 All analyses are conducted using population sample weights calculated from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ Current Population Survey. I normalize all weights 
based on the number of removed observations and final sample size N. Since I am 
primarily concerned with the creation of independent, new businesses, I remove 213 
observations from all analyses. These observations represent nascent entrepreneurs 
engaged in other start-up opportunities. Item AA10 in the PSED II questionnaire asks, 
“Would you describe this new business as an independent new business created by an 
individual or a team working on its own, a purchase or takeover of an existing business, a 
franchise, a multi-level marketing initiative, a new business sponsored by an existing 
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business, or something else?” I remove 37 purchases or takeovers of existing businesses, 
38 franchises, 55 multi-level marketing initiatives, and 83 new businesses that are 
sponsored by existing businesses. The final sample in this analysis is 1,001 independent, 
new businesses. 
 Chapter 1 described the financing variables in the PSED II questionnaire. Sections 
Q and R contain items related to the sources of funding acquired by respondents. Certain 
types of funding require that the business be formally established by registering with an 
appropriate government agency. Section Q covers funding sources acquired before 
registration. Section R covers funding sources acquired after registration. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 FINANCE. The dependent variable is categorized as the three financing groups 
described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Macro-financers are coded “0”, and represent 
the nascent ventures in the PSED II data set that acquired over $230,000 during the start-
up process. These firms fall in the 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of firm financing. 
Average financers are coded as “1” and represent those acquiring amounts near the 
average amount of financing for all firms, which is $24,077. Non-financers are coded as 
“2”. This category includes nascent entrepreneurs using $0 - $500. 
 
Independent and Control Variables 
 Time in Process (TIME). TIME represents the number of months between the date 
the individual first started thinking about the business, and the date that the individual 
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either (a) started a new firm, or (b) disengaged from the process. For individuals still 
trying during the final wave of data collection, I use (c) the date of the final interview. 
The time in process, industry, and education variables address issues of sample 
heterogeneity related to samples of nascent ventures (Davidsson & Gordon, 2011). 
 Legal Status (LEGAL). Respondents are asked about the current legal form of the 
new business. Dummy variables are created based on a categorical variable LEGAL, 
coded “0” if the business is a sole proprietorship, general partnership, or limited 
partnership; “1” if a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), Sub-chapter S Corporation or 
general corporation; and “2” if the legal form has not been determined by the final wave 
of data collection. 
 Financial Planning (PLAN). Item D26 in the questionnaire asks respondents, 
“Have financial projection, such as income or cash flow statements or break-even 
analyses, been developed, will financial projections be developed in the future, or is this 
not relevant for the new business?” PLAN is coded “0” if no formal financial took place 
during the start-up process; and “1” if the nascent entrepreneur undertook some form of 
formalized financial planning. 
 Industry (INDUSTRY). Respondents are asked to best describe the new business 
based on a set of industry descriptions, which are based on NAICS codes. INDUSTRY is 
coded as “0” for asset intensive industries (e.g., retail stores, restaurants, taverns, bars, 
nightclubs, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, mining, wholesale distribution, 
transportation, utilities, communications, and real estate); and “1” for service industries 
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(e.g., customer or customer service, health, education, social services, communications, 
finance, insurance, and business consulting). 
 Metro Location (METRO). Based on the respondent‟s zip code and categorization 
by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, METRO is coded as “0” if 
the respondent lives in the center city of a metro area, inside a center city county, inside a 
suburban county, or in a general metropolitan area; and “1” if living in a rural area. 
 Proprietary technology (TECH). Respondents are asked, “Has this new business 
developed any proprietary technology, processes, or procedures that no other company 
can use, will it develop proprietary technology, processes, or procedures in the future, or 
is this not relevant to the new business?” TECH is coded as “0” for Yes, and “1” for No. 
 Sex (SEX). SEX is coded as “0” for male; and “1” for female. 
 Race (RACE). RACE is coded as “0” for White/Caucasian; and “1” for 
Black/African American, Asian/Asian American, and other races. 
 Education (EDU). EDU is a series of dummy variables based on a categorical 
variable coded as “0” if the respondent completed at least a high school education; “1” 
for some college, community college, or a technical or vocational degree; “2” for a 
Bachelors degree; and “3” for some graduate school, a Masters degree, or for law, MD, 
PhD, and EDD degrees. 
 Prior Start-up Experience (EXP). EXP is a series of dummy variables based on a 
categorical variable coded as “0” if the respondent has no start-up experience; “1” for one 
prior successful startup; “2” for two or more. 
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 Net Worth (NETWORTH). NETWORTH is calculated from a series of questions 
that determine the value of the individual‟s home(s), the amount still owed on any 
mortgages, the amount of any non-home related debts, the amount of savings and 
investments, and the value of any vehicles, jewelry, and other assets. 
 Firm Size (SIZE). I control for firm size as it is frequently linked to the survival 
and performance of new firms. Larger firms are more likely to survive, and larger new 
ventures are more likely to benefit from scale economies (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994; 
Geroski, et al., 2010). Smaller companies have also been found to have higher death 
rates, compared to larger firms (Dunne & Hughes, 1994; Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009)  
Small businesses may also have a difficult time with high transaction costs associated 
with the acquisition of resources such as formal funding or expensive equipment (Ang, 
1992). 
 Respondents are asked, “Which of the following two statements best describes 
your preference for the future size of this new business: I want this new business to be as 
large as possible, or I want a size I can manage myself or with a few key employees?” 
SIZE is coded “0” if the individual wants it to be as large as possible; and “1” for a size 
manageable by self or with key employees. Determining the size of a firm at such an 
early stage presents difficulties. Traditional measures of firm size such as the number of 
employees, or the amount of revenue, do not necessarily apply to nascent ventures as the 
business is not yet operational. Therefore, the size intentions of the nascent entrepreneur 




 The categorical dependent variable representing the three categories nascent 
venture financing amounts (non-financing, average, and fat-tail financing) is tested using 
multinomial logistic regression.  The model estimates effects certain firm characteristics 
have on the likelihood that a nascent venture will fall within the fat-tail of a series of 
success measures. All analyses are weighted so that the sample better matches the overall 
population. The number of nascent ventures tested is 939 (missing values among the 




 Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for each category of financing represented 
in the dependent variable. Average financers make up the largest group, with 738 cases; 
212 cases are non-financers; and 51 cases are fat-tail financers using more than $230,000 
to fund the nascent venture. Table 3.2 depicts the multicollinearity diagnostics for the 
model. Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, and Tolerance values are near 1 
(Allison, 1999). 
 
    FIN_GRP |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
   Fat Tail |         51        5.09        5.09 
    Average |        738       73.73       78.82 
        Non |        212       21.18      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,001      100.00 
 
Table 3.1 : Dependent Variable Distribution 
 
 87 
  Variable      VIF  Tolerance  
---------------------------------- 
  FAT TAIL      1.13    0.8870 
      TIME      1.04    0.9598 
     LEGAL      1.03    0.9663  
      PLAN      1.10    0.9113   
  INDUSTRY      1.02    0.9778     
     METRO      1.08    0.9219     
      TECH      1.07    0.9324     
       SEX      1.02    0.9804  
      RACE      1.09    0.9187     
       EDU      1.09    0.9194     
   LOG_EXP      1.08    0.9264     
  NETWORTH      1.07    0.9373     
      SIZE      1.06    0.9472     
---------------------------------- 
  Mean VIF      1.07 
 
Table 3.2 : Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
 
Analysis 
 The multinomial logistic regression in Table 3.3 predicts the likelihood of the 
nascent entrepreneur being a macro-financer, average-financer, or non-financer, using 
time, firm characteristics, and personal characteristics as predictors. The top numbers 
represent odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses below. The percent change 
represents a change in odds of the upper outcome over the lower (e.g., macro-financer 
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-67.3 -56.9 -24.1 
(N = 939) 
chi2(df=28) = 113.28; p<0.000 
Pseudo R2 = .1338 
Log pseudo likelihood = -553.12 
a Top values are odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Percent change in odds of the upper outcome occurring over the lower, 
 for increases in the independent variable, holding all other variables 
 constant. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; * p<.05 
 
Table 3.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting the Likelihood of Macro-
Financing, Based on Firm and Personal Characteristics. 
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 Hypothesis 1, the more time nascent entrepreneurs act to create a new firm, the 
more likely they are to be macro-financers, is not supported. In fact, as time goes on, 
nascent entrepreneurs are equally likely to be either macro-financers or non-financers. 
 Hypothesis 2, nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate their nascent ventures are 
more likely to be macro-financers, is supported. Nascent entrepreneurs that incorporate 
are over five times more likely to be macro-financers than non-financers; and over five 
times more likely to be macro-financers than average-financers. 
 Hypothesis 3, nascent entrepreneurs that have completed financial projections will 
more likely be macro-financers, is supported. The odds of macro-financing over non-
financing drop by 91.7% for nascent entrepreneurs that do not create financial plans, 
while the odds of macro-financing over average-financing drop by 81%. The odds of 
average-financing over non-financing drop by 56.4% for non-planners. 
 Hypothesis 4, nascent entrepreneurs starting businesses in asset intensive 
industries will more likely be macro-financers, is supported. The odds of macro-financing 
over non-financing for nascent entrepreneurs in service industries drop by 72.7%, and the 
odds of macro-financing over average-financing drop by 70.7%. 
 Hypothesis 5, nascent entrepreneurs in or near metro areas will more likely be 
macro-financers, is not supported. However, the odds of average-financing over non-
financing for rural nascent entrepreneurs increase by 69.9%. 
 Hypothesis 6, nascent entrepreneurs creating businesses using on proprietary 
technology will more likely be macro-financers, is not supported. 
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 Hypotheses 7a – 7e dealing with characteristics of the entrepreneur (i.e., sex, race, 
education, experience, and net worth) were not supported. Personal characteristics did not 
affect whether a nascent entrepreneur use or acquire vast amounts of financing. 
 This analysis also controlled for the nascent entrepreneur‟s growth intentions for 
the venture. For those nascent entrepreneurs expecting to keep the venture to a 
manageable size (i.e., able to be run individually or with a few key employees), the odds 
of macro-financing over non-financing drop by 67.3%. Also, the odds of macro-financing 




 The previous analyses in this dissertation find that personal characteristics such as 
sex, race, education, and experience do affect the start-up outcomes, as well as the types 
of financing used and acquired. The personal characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs are 
not a significant indicator for whether vast amounts of financing are used, however. This 
finding echoes similar findings in other studies on start-up financing (Cassar, 2004), and 
may be an indication that as nascent ventures transition into new firms (i.e., independent 
actors affecting prices and quantities in the larger economy), firm and industry 
characteristics explain more of the variance between financing groups. The reality is that 
there does not seem to be an archetypical “macro-financer”, or high-potential nascent 
entrepreneur. Macro-financers come from different socioeconomic backgrounds; start 
different types of firms; and in different industries. 
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 While there may not be any one “type” of macro-financer, certain firm and 
industry characteristics are associated with a high likelihood of using or acquiring large 
amounts of money. This analysis controls for the growth intentions of the nascent 
entrepreneur, and finds that those intending to grow their ventures as large as possible are 
more likely to be macro-financers. Other studies find growth intentions of early stage 
entrepreneurs to be associated with seeking out larger amounts of external equity 
(Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2006). In light of findings in Chapter 1, it would seem that 
while nascent entrepreneurs accurately match growth intentions to resource acquisition 
strategies, they may not be as successful matching overall growth strategies to the 
opportunity being pursued. The analysis in Chapter 1 finds that nascent entrepreneurs 
intending to grow the firm as large as possible are less likely to create a new firm. Taken 
together the two findings support assertions that entrepreneurial risk is linked to how well 
the entrepreneur matches resources to the opportunity (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985). 
 The longer a nascent entrepreneur works on the venture, the likelihood of using 
either a lot of money or no money at all increases equally. Macro-financers also are more 
likely to continue working on the venture for at least five years, compared to average-
financers. It appears that the amount of time spent working on the nascent venture has an 
accelerated effect on whether a nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts result in being categorized 
into certain “outlier” groups – in this case, macro-financers and non-financers. The 
relationship between time and performance has been investigated, drawing similar 
conclusions. Corporate entrepreneurship has a modest effect on company performance 
early on, but increases with time (Zahra & Covin, 1995); and the same as been found in 
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the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation (i.e., acting proactively, innovatively, 
and taking risks) and performance (Wiklund, 2006). 
 Macro-financers are more likely to have incorporated their nascent ventures, and 
to have prepared formalized financial plans. They are also more likely to be starting 
ventures in asset-intensive industries. These results are consistent with almost all studies 
on entrepreneurial financing where both the type of financing (i.e., formal sources such as 
banks) and amount correlate to firm and industry characteristics. We would expect 
incorporated nascent ventures in industries such as manufacturing, retail, and 
construction to require large capital outlays. 
 The results for rural nascent entrepreneurs compared to nascent entrepreneurs 
located in metro areas are not statistically significant. However, rural nascent 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be average financers than non-financers. Investigating 
the non-financers in more detail reveals that many are consultants and have considerable 
experience in a specific industry. It is likely that these non-financers need to be near their 
clients, and surrounded by the market in which they operate. Therefore, non-financing, 
rural nascent entrepreneurs will be an unlikely combination. The non-financers are 
investigated in more detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NASCENT ENTREPRENEURS THAT USE LITTLE TO NO FINANCING 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 1 introduced two views on who bears the risks of entrepreneurship. The 
Schumpeterian view is that the entrepreneur‟s role is to innovate and introduce new 
combinations of resources and means of production to the economy. The Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur does not bear the risk, the financier does. The Knightian view of 
entrepreneurship differentiates between risk and uncertainty – risk is calculable and able 
to be insured against while uncertainty is made up of the “unknown unknowns”. Knight‟s 
entrepreneur bears this uncertainty and shields financiers from it. 
 The findings from the analyses in Chapters 1 and 2 support the Knightian view. In 
the context of the financing of emerging firms, nascent entrepreneurs first bear the risk 
before external financiers enter the picture. However, most empirical investigations into 
Knightian entrepreneurship assume that risk is endogenous to the entrepreneur, taking the 
form of occupational choice between salaried work, or creating a new firm (Newman, 
2007). During the interview process for the PSED II, respondents who disengage from 
the start-up process are asked why they did so. Only 9% of nascent entrepreneurs in the 
U.S. who disengage between 2005 and 2010 do so for other career opportunities. The 
number one reason for disengaging is personal issues – 38% of respondents cite life-
changing events (e.g., divorce, having a baby), or health issues (e.g., lung cancer). 
 The notion of risk is much more nuanced for nascent entrepreneurs than depicted 
by traditional theory. Or, it is at least more nuanced than has been traditionally 
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investigated by scholars throughout the years. Another view on the risks involved with 
entrepreneurship, mentioned in previous chapters, is proposed by Stevenson and 
Gumpbert (1985): risk for the entrepreneur is based on whether the individual properly 
matches resources at-hand to the opportunity pursued. Much of the research on 
entrepreneurship is rooted in the resource based theory of the firm. According to this 
view, firms achieve a competitive advantage over other firms when they acquire 
resources that are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and costly to imitate (Barney, 1991). 
Financial resources have been linked to growth and performance in both large and small 
firms, and few would dispute the importance of cash to an early-stage venture. Yet, from 
the PSED II sample used in this dissertation we can see that 20% of nascent ventures in 
the U.S. rely on $500 or less during the process of creating the firm. Of this group of non-
financers, 17 become operational, new firms by 2010. 
 This chapter describes these ventures that begin with very little financial capital, 
and the individuals that start them. One might assume that nascent ventures using little to 
no money are routine start-ups – businesses that can be run from the home and based on 
skills and tools already acquired by the individual (e.g., a barber or hairstylist, a daycare, 
consulting). But, consider the example of Sierra On-Line. Sierra created the first 
graphics-based computer games in the early 1980s, and was eventually sold to a 
conglomerate for close to $1 billion. The company was started by Ken and Roberta 
Williams. Ken, a programmer for IBM, and his wife Roberta, created the first game 
entitled Mystery House. The game was created in their home with Roberta doing much of 
the writing and art work at the kitchen table. Mystery House was written onto floppy 
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discs, packaged in Ziploc bags, and mailed to friends and co-workers. Sierra On-Line 
eventually went on to create many of the best-selling games of that decade. One might 
attribute Sierra‟s success to being in a high-growth industry (i.e., the personal computing 
industry was poised to explode in the early 1980s). While this was definitely a factor, 
consider the mundane, low-margin grocery industry. Even Whole Foods was once young, 
founded by a college dropout and his girlfriend who, while living in the back room of 
their first store, took showers with a hose attached to a dishwasher. 
 The PSED II allows for the investigation of new firms created under conditions of 
resource scarcity. Analyzing these ventures from a resource perspective may reveal 
information that a traditional Knightian risk analysis cannot. In the remainder of this 
chapter I provide an overview of the theoretical frameworks of bootstrapping, 
effectuation, and bricolage, each of which addresses the issue of starting a firm with 
limited resources. I will also present data from the PSED II on the non-financed nascent 
ventures. 
 
Literature Related to Non-Financing 
 Over the past decade, the resource based theory of firm performance has featured 
prominently in the entrepreneurship literature. The resource based view is a concept from 
the field of strategic management that says that a firm‟s success or failure depends on the 
resources it controls (Barney, 1991). It is reasonable to assume that nascent ventures 
control fewer resources than established firms – financing in particular. Indeed, new 
firms in the PSED II sample are largely defined by whether they have had positive cash 
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flow for most of the year. But, if nascent entrepreneurs have access to fewer resources, 
how then are they able to catch up, and even compete with, established businesses? 
 It may be that large resource endowments actually hinder some entrepreneurs. 
Costs associated with easy access to resources include core rigidities (becoming so good 
at something that past success makes it difficult to pursue new trajectories); reduced 
experimentation (past successes making new opportunities seem less valuable or more 
risky); and increased transparency (as more resources are controlled, competitors become 
more aware of what strategy the firm is trying to pursue) (Mosakowski, 2002). 
Avoidance of these costs may partially explain how start-ups that use little to no 
financing are able to get off the ground. 
 While a resource-based view of the firm may be useful for analyzing some 
aspects of the entrepreneurial process, it may be an inadequate framework for studying 
nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED. An analysis of the resources possessed by the 
founders of Sierra On-Line during its first year in the early 1980s might generate the 
following list: 
 
 Intangible resources: Ken Williams‟ knowledge of computer programming; his 
contacts in the fledgling industry; Roberta Williams‟ passion for writing stories 
 Tangible resources: personal computer; space at home to work; the founders‟ 
income; net worth, and any assets (leverage for a bank loan, if needed); blank 
floppy discs, stamps, envelopes, and Ziploc bags for packaging and shipping 
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 Not exactly the harbinger of a multi-million dollar software company that would 
go on to revolutionize video game design. A nascent entrepreneur‟s stock of resources 
may be so vague or nondescript that a purely resource-based analysis will fail to reveal 
the potential value. For this reason, analyzing the nascent entrepreneur‟s actions and 
intentions are important if one wishes to draw conclusions from the earliest stages of 
organizational creation. 
 Chapter 1 presented a bootstrapping framework for analyzing entrepreneurial 
activity. Financial bootstrapping strategies are methods of meeting financial resource 
needs without resorting to sources of external financing. Methods of bootstrapping might 
include delaying payments to suppliers to preserve cash-on-hand, drawing on support 
from friends and family for financing or office space, reducing accounts receivable and 
inventory, or developing strong support networks (Winborg & Landström, 2001). Prior 
research on bootstrapping has found that technology-based firms place more importance 
on bootstrapping techniques that improve cash flows, compared to nontechnology-based 
firms (e.g. terminating agreements with late payers, using credit cards, charging interest 
on overdue accounts, and borrowing equipment) (Auken, 2005). Also, bootstrapping 
strategies may differ depending on the age of the firm. Early stage firms rely more on 
owner-related and relationship-oriented techniques, while more developed firms depend 
on customer-related techniques such as the negotiation of payment terms (Ebben & 
Johnson, 2006). 
 The thought processes that underlie a nascent entrepreneur‟s actions can also 
reveal how non-financers or otherwise resource-poor individuals are able to start 
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successful businesses. Effectual reasoning is a process by which the entrepreneur uses a 
set of evolving means already possessed to creatively achieve or transform a goal 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). Effectuation stands in contrast to the standard belief that 
entrepreneurs set a goal before identifying what resources and steps are necessary to 
achieve it. Returning to the example of Sierra On-Line, Ken and Roberta Williams took 
stock in what they had (knowledge, industry connections, passion and interest in the 
endeavor), and then experimented and transformed these resources into a viable product 
(a graphics-based computer mystery game). 
 Effectuation is closely related to financial bootstrapping in that the entrepreneur 
leverages his or her social network to cut costs. The concept of affordable loss may also 
be linked to the PSED‟s group of non-financers. Affordable loss entails risking only what 
is necessary so that if the entrepreneur fails, he does so cheaply. As a decision tool for 
financing the emerging firm, affordable loss means creatively lowering the amount of 
money needed to start the business by accounting for how much time is necessary to 
work on the business, the opportunity cost of any money invested, and deciding exactly 
how much one is willing to lose (Sarasvathy, 2006). 
 Whereas effectuation theory describes the cognitive processes underpinning 
entrepreneurial decision making, bricolage theory directly addresses how entrepreneurs 
act in the face of severe resource constraints. Bricolage is a term originally coined by 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and is about making do with current resources, rather 
than engaging in resource-seeking behavior. A key proposition of bricolage theory as it 
relates to entrepreneurial activity is that founders‟ activities will be strongly shaped by 
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the contact networks in which they operate (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003). Sierra On-
Line‟s founders, again, can be viewed as an example of using resources at hand. 
Following Baker and Nelson‟s (2005) process model of bricolage and growth, Sierra‟s 
founders generated “something from nothing” (i.e., using Ken‟s experience and network 
contacts, and Roberta‟s story writing inputs to create a graphics-based adventure game), 
and through mutually reinforcing factors, such as the initial acceptance of the first 
samples of the game sent out to friends and family in Ziploc bags, as well as being in the 
right place at the right time (i.e., California in the early 1980s in the midst of a growing 
personal computing industry), the nascent venture was able to grow into a successful new 
firm. 
 What emerges from looking at Sierra‟s early years from a bricolage framework is 
the relative non-importance of financial capital. Remember, Sierra was a nascent venture 
that would go on to a successful IPO before being sold for almost $1 billion dollars, more 
than 20 years after humble beginnings in the home of a spousal team. This is not to say 
that money was not important. What bricolage does reveal in this case is that competent 
founders will find a way. Research has demonstrated that human and financial capital 
may be substitutable – firms with high levels of founder human capital and low levels of 
financial capital perform as well as firms with low human capital, and high financial 





Analysis of Non-Financers in the PSED II 
 To identify the non-financers in the PSED II, I calculate the sum total of all 
financial capital acquired or drawn from the respondent‟s personal savings. Of the 1,001 
respondents who indicate that they are starting an independent new venture, 212 (19%) 
said that they acquired $500 or less between 2005 and 2010. Table 4.1 shows the number 
of these “non-financers” to start a new firm, disengage, or remain trying throughout all 
five years of the sample. Perhaps not surprisingly, 128 (60.4%) non-financing, nascent 
entrepreneurs disengage from the process of starting a new business. Of the remaining 
non-financers: 31 (14.6%) are still trying; and 17 (9%) successfully start new firms. Note 
that 34 (16%) cases are missing. No information is available for these cases as they were 
unreachable by the survey administrators after initial screening took place in 2005. 
 
    | New Firm   Still Try   Disengage   Missing    Total 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
    |    17          31         128           34      212  
    |  8.96%     14.62%      60.38%       16.04%     100%  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 4.1 : Nascent Venture Outcomes for Non-Financed Startup Attempts 
 
 Analyses in previous chapters have shown that more money is associated with a 
higher likelihood of success in starting a new firm, when controlling for factors such as 
industry, and characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur. However, there is no statistical 
difference between non-financers that successfully start a new business and non-financers 
that disengage from the process, when looking at each factor separately. Tables 4.2 
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through 4.10 show the frequencies of the final outcome of non-financed nascent ventures 
by the variables uses throughout the analyses in this dissertation. 
 Industry. Non-financed, successful new ventures are split relatively evenly 
between asset intensive industries (42.1%), and service industries (58%). Non-financed 
nascent ventures that disengaged from the start-up process are also evenly split – 46.8% 
in asset intensive industries, and 53.1% in service industries. 
 Legal Form. Among successful new firms, 33.3% are incorporated. Among 
disengaged nascent ventures, 18.9% are incorporated. 
 Financial Planning. Among new firms, 36.9% undertake formal financial 
planning; among disengaged firms, 25% do. 
 Metro Location. Among new firms, 89.4% are in or near metro areas; among 
disengaged firms, 75.8% are. 
 Proprietary Technology. Among new firms, 10.5% utilize proprietary technology; 
among disengaged firms only 5.5% do. 
 Sex. Whether a start-up attempt results in a new firm or is disengaged is evenly 
split between males and females. Among new firms, 52.6% are started by males and 
47.4% by females. 
 Race. Minorities account for 15.7% of all non-financed new firms, and 25.7% of 
disengaged firms. 
 Education. Nascent entrepreneurs with a post-graduate education (masters degree 
or higher), account for 31.6% of all non-financed new firms and 15% of disengaged 
firms. 
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 Start-up Experience. Among non-financed new firms, 36.9% are started by 
nascent entrepreneurs with two or more prior successful start-ups. For nascent 
entrepreneurs with no prior start-up experience, 61% disengage from the process. 
 None of the cell differences in these tables are statistically significant. 
 
  INDUSTRY |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Asset |         8         12         60  
           |     42.11      38.71      46.88  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
 Non Asset |         9         19         68  
           |     57.89      61.29      53.13  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        128  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.2 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Industry 
 
 
     LEGAL |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Uninc |        12         22         73  
           |     66.67      84.62      81.11  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
       Inc |         5          4         17  
           |     33.33      15.38      18.89  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         26         90  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.3 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Legal Form 
 
 
 FIN. PLAN |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
       Yes |         6          9         32  
           |     36.84      29.03      25.00  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
        No |        11         22         96  
           |     63.16      70.97      75.00  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        128  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 





     METRO |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Metro |        15         25         97  
           |     89.47      80.65      75.78  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Rural |         2          6         31  
           |     10.53      19.35      24.22  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        128  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.5 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Metro Location 
 
 
      TECH |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
        No |        16         26        120  
           |     89.47      83.87      94.49  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
       Yes |         1          5          7  
           |     10.53      16.13       5.51  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        127  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.6 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Proprietary Technology 
 
 
       SEX |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
      Male |         9         17         71  
           |     52.63      54.84      55.47  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
    Female |         8         14         57  
           |     47.37      45.16      44.53  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        128  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.7 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Sex 
 
 
        RACE |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-------------+--------------------------------- 
Non Minority |        16         24         95  
             |     84.21      77.42      74.22  
-------------+--------------------------------- 
    Minority |         1          7         33  
             |     15.79      22.58      25.78  
-------------+--------------------------------- 
       Total |        17         31        128  
             |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 




       EDU |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
        HS |         2         13         46  
           |     15.79      41.94      36.22  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
   College |         9         15         62  
           |     52.63      48.39      48.82  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
 Post Grad |         6          3         19  
           |     31.58       9.68      14.96  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        127  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.9 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Education 
 
 
  STARTUPS |  New Firm  Still Try  Disengage  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
      None |         6         15         78  
           |     36.84      48.39      60.94  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
         1 |         4          9         26  
           |     26.32      29.03      20.31  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
        2+ |         7          7         24   
           |     36.84      22.58      18.75  
-----------+--------------------------------- 
     Total |        17         31        128  
           |    100.00     100.00     100.00  
 
Table 4.10 : Non-Financed Firm Outcome Status by Start-Up Experience 
 
 
 A closer look at the non-financers from the PSED II who successfully start a new 
firm reveals more detailed information. Three respondents have a net worth greater than 
$1 million, while four have a negative net worth. One is Hispanic, and the remaining 
Caucasian. Nine successful non-financers (close to 50%) run the business from their 
primary residence, while in the overall sample approximately 25% of all new firms are 
home-based. Only two respondents produced a formally written business plan during the 
start-up process.  
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 Respondent 50095. Female, age 40-44, unemployed, married, and has completed 
some college. She resides in a metro area in the Southern Atlantic region, and has a 
household net worth of $250,000. Her business is in construction and residential 
remodeling. She started the business to make money and to take advantage of an 
opportunity, and because it was a low cost opportunity. The biggest problems she faced 
starting the business were acquiring financing, and time management (six individuals 
reside in her household). She made $50,000 in revenue her first year of operations, and 
paid $40,000 in expenses. 
 Respondent 51669. Male, age 45-49, married, and has a postgraduate education. 
He lives in a rural area in the Southern Atlantic region and has a net worth of $58,000. 
His business is in scientific and technical services. He started the business to be his own 
boss. The greatest problem he faced was advertising and marketing. His revenues went 
from $1,000 to $10,000 between years one and two of operations. 
 Respondent 50320. Female, age 60-64, employed part time, married, and has a 
Bachelors degree. She resides in a metro area in the Pacific region, has a personal income 
of $22,000 and a net worth of $40,000. Her business is in janitorial services. She started 
the business to make money, and because she is retired. She also saw a high demand for 
the service and she has a passion for it. The greatest difficult she had while starting the 
business was for an unidentified personal reason. She made $3,600 in revenue during her 
first year. 
 Respondent 50745. Female, age 30-34, married, and has completed some college. 
She resides in the middle Atlantic region and has a net worth of $52,000. She started a 
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bookstore. Her motivation was that she believes in the value of work and feels that 
business is important. She had vast resources and material to start the business, and 
otherwise low cost access to supplies and materials. She said she had no problems 
starting the business. Her revenues during the first four years of operation were $5,000; 
$2,000; $18,000; and $10,000. 
 Respondent 50396. Male, age 60-64, employed, single, and has completed some 
college. He resides in a metro area in the Eastern, North Central region, and has a net 
worth of $250,000. His business is providing services to the elderly. He started the 
business to earn income in retirement, and because he saw high demand for the service 
and he wanted to be his own boss. The greatest problem he faced was marketing to 
customers. He made $4,000 in revenue during his first year of operations. 
 Respondent 50477. Male, age 55-59, employed, married, and has a postgraduate 
degree (Masters or beyond). He resides in a metro area in the South Atlantic region, and 
has a net income of $125,000 and a net worth of $250,000. His business is executive 
search consulting. He started the business to be his own boss, to make money, and 
because he was encouraged to do so by his connections in industry. He also has a passion 
for the work. The greatest problem he faced was transportation. He made $60,000 in 
revenue, and paid $45,000 in expenses his first year of operations. In year two he made 






 As with the macro-financers in Chapter 3, there is no typical non-financer. 
Nascent entrepreneurs that do not use money to start their businesses give many reasons 
for why they entered into entrepreneurship. They also face many kinds of problems; the 
types of businesses created vary from one to the next; as do the personal characteristics of 
the individuals starting them. While a greater proportion of successful, non-financed 
businesses are home-based compared to the entire population of entrepreneurs (50% 
compared to 25%), one would be hard-pressed to label all 17 of these ventures as 
mundane or routine. Some are quickly making upwards of $80,000 using only prior 
knowledge and resources already accumulated. When looking at these firms and the 
individual that start them in more detail, effectuation and bricolage strategies seem to 
emerge. 
 The Knightian view of risk-bearing is not to be totally abandoned, however. Non-
financers disengage at high rates (up to 60%), and start new firms at low rates (9%). 
Personal investments of capital, from the entrepreneur‟s savings, credit card, or other 
internally generated source, are associated with a higher likelihood of starting new firms. 
Nascent entrepreneurs do shoulder much of the early risk associated with the start-up 
process. 
 Despite the heterogeneity found among non-financing nascent entrepreneurs, 
there are some commonalities. Non-financers are likely to be in metro areas, have a post-
graduate level education, and also to have been a part of two or more prior start-ups. 
Human and social capital, therefore, are important substitutes for a lack of financial 
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capital (Chandler & Hanks, 1998). Among the 17 new firms in the non-financing group, a 
few are individuals pursuing consulting careers after retirement. This also explains the 
educational background and need to be near customers and the market (i.e., in metro 
areas). Given the variation among both successful and unsuccessful non-financers, a 
cluster analysis might reveal more similarities and differences within this group, and 
among the macro-financing and average-financing groups. Based on the analysis in this 
chapter I surmise that likely candidates for clusters are retirees, and individuals with 
high-human capital and experience. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Implications for Policymakers 
 The findings in this dissertation have important implications for policymakers. 
The majority of nascent entrepreneurial activity in the United States is self-financed. 
Over 90% of nascent entrepreneurs use some form of personal money to finance their 
start-ups (e.g., personal savings, credit cards), and two-thirds use only personal money, 
with no external financing whatsoever. Public policy must differ depending on whether 
self-financing is a choice or the result of barriers to capital. This dissertation finds that the 
odds of women acquiring formal financing are 44.5% less than for males; and that 
minorities are three times more likely than non-minorities to use informal sources over 
formal sources. These findings indicate that barriers to capital exist for certain 
demographics during the start-up‟s early, gestation phase. This is supported by extant 
literature that finds the same is true for entrepreneurs that have already established a 
business. It might be assumed that self-financing is likely to be a choice among macro-
financers. Wealthy individuals may choose to avoid the time and effort that goes into 
procuring outside financing, or they may wish to maintain control of the firm. While a 
nominally significant proportion of the macro-financers are retirees or high net worth 
individuals, recall respondent 50095 from the PSED II (a non-financer, her case is 
presented in Chapter Four). She has a large household net worth, and her opportunity is 
low cost. Yet she states that the biggest problem she faces is financing. Policies that 
assume personal financing is a choice may result in many nascent entrepreneurs being 
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forced to put more of their personal assets at risk than might otherwise be necessary, 
which can hinder the growth of the new firm or lead to disengagement. 
 The findings in this dissertation also inform a growing tension between two 
groups: those that view entrepreneurship as the creation of high-impact, gazelle firms; 
and those that view entrepreneurship as the providence of all society and a means by 
which individuals can improve their economic circumstances (Crawford, 2011). The 
question becomes whether government should try to pick winners, or act as referee and 
ensure everyone has equal access to the resources necessary to start a business. “Picking 
winners” is policy prescription that directly promotes technologies and industries 
believed to have the highest potential for creating jobs and adding to the GDP. 
Prescriptive policies depend on scientific knowledge to inform one course of action over 
another. Government investment in research and development in information and 
communication technologies throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is an example of 
the successful support of a target industry (Marich, 2010). 
 Alternatively, policies that aim to provide equal opportunity across society can 
address resource constraints faced by nascent entrepreneurs. Redlining – the act of 
denying banking services to certain regions or neighborhoods based on race and 
socioeconomic demographics – is illegal in the United States. However, I find that 
minorities in the PSED II rarely use formal sources of financing. And, they are more 
likely to use informal sources over formal sources compared to non-minorities. These 
findings echo other studies showing that small businesses in minority neighborhoods 
receive fewer loans (Immergluck, 2002). Stringent penalties enforced by the FDIC 
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(having the power to terminate the status of an insured bank) can deter the practice of 
redlining. 
 Arguments against policies that encourage picking winners cite massive 
productivity differences between similar firms, even within narrow industry 
classifications (Kerr & Nanda, 2010; Syverson, Haltiwanger, & Foster, 2008). Firm 
specific forces explain a significant amount of the variation in productivity growth and 
decline. I find the same to be true with nascent entrepreneurs. Personal characteristics 
drive much of the variation in outcomes across the PSED II sample. Among macro-
financed nascent ventures, firm characteristics drive the variation. Also, in addition to the 
many idiosyncratic factors that determine growth and survival, my findings (and those of 
extant research) show that the choice of individuals to become entrepreneurs is not 
always financial in nature (Kerr & Nanda, 2010). Under such conditions, it may be 
impossible to create policies that target a specific group of individuals. 
 These same idiosyncratic characteristics, among firms and individuals, are also 
present when the government acts as referee. For example, a 1987 tax reform in Denmark 
that increased the cost of external financing also caused a 40% decrease in the rate of 
entry into entrepreneurship. However, the decrease was attributed to low entrepreneurial 
ability, and not financial constraints (Nanda, 2008). Larger institutional effects can also 
limit a policy‟s effectiveness. In China and India, banking authorities heavily regulate 
informal financing in an effort to increase the availability of money from more visible 
microfinance institutions (Tsai, 2004). However, limited access to formal credit, political 
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segmentation of markets, and other institutional weaknesses limit the effect these policies 
have on low-income entrepreneurs (2004). 
 The answer to whether government should pick winners or act as referee is likely 
somewhere in between. But, it requires differentiating between nascent industries, 
nascent firms, and nascent entrepreneurs. Picking winners has been successful when 
applied to nascent industries, but at the level of the individual, policies that ensure equal 
access to the resources necessary to create a new firm may be more successful. The 
White House recently released a fact sheet on its “Startup America” initiative, designed 
to encourage high-growth entrepreneurship across the United States. The principal goal is 
to create jobs and bring innovations to market in key industries such as clean energy, 
medicine, advanced manufacturing, and information technology (2011). The following 
are the principal commitments of the Obama Administration‟s entrepreneurship policy as 
listed on the White House fact sheet, along with recommendations based on the findings 
in this dissertation, and extant research. 
 Expanding Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs. The Small Business 
Administration (SBA) will match private sector investment in promising, high-growth 
companies. The $2 billion investment fund is divided into: (1) $1 billion to match private 
capital 2:1 on investments in growth companies located in distressed areas; and (2) a $1 
billion “Innovation Fund” to match, 1:1, private capital raised by early stage, high-growth 
companies. While government support for promising industries has been successful in the 
past, this particular policy focuses on the firm level without, which may prove 
problematic. I find that among new firms in the PSED II, macro-financers and non-
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financers are starting new firms at the same rate. Also, a higher percentage of macro-
financers are still trying after five years in the process of creating a new firm, compared 
to average- and non-financers that either start new firms or exit. A possible reason that 
many venture backed investments fail is because the vast amounts of money are used to 
grow the business before a proper business model has been discovered (Wilson, 2007). 
This would explain why so many macro-financed firms remain in-process. For truly 
resource constrained start-ups, the reverse is true – they do not have the money to pursue 
a different business model should the first one fail (2007). This situation reflects the 
“resource matching” problem I discuss in this dissertation, where the true risk of 
entrepreneurship is in matching the right resources to the right opportunity. The $2 billion 
fund may be more successful by taking this into account. 
 Simplify Rules for $5 Billion in Tax Credits for Private Investment in Lower-
Income Communities. The Treasury Department will reform the “New Markets Tax 
Credit” to simplify attracting investment in start-ups in low-income communities. I find 
that nascent entrepreneurs starting new firms use more money than those that disengage. 
But, those that quit might quit for reasons other than money (in fact, most quit for 
personal reasons). It is not money itself that increases the odds of getting into business, 
but good opportunities attract money and bad opportunities do not. Therefore, rule 
simplifications should be targeted so that they allow better opportunities to be identified, 
more quickly. 
 Connecting Mentors and Entrepreneurs. The SBA and Department of Energy will 
fund a private mentorship program aimed specifically at clean tech startups. The program 
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will take place in four business accelerators that provide intensive mentorship from 
seasoned entrepreneurs to the most promising new companies previously funded by the 
Department of Energy. Also, the Department of Veterans Affairs will launch two 
accelerators focused on helping Veterans start new businesses, in any industry. While I 
find that, overall, experience among nascent entrepreneurs is not an indicator of whether 
a new firm is created; it is a significant factor among entrepreneurs that use little to no 
financing. I surmise that experience is also a significant factor for successful macro-
financers. They should be able to find an appropriate business model sooner. Targeted 
mentorship that focuses on implementing the right business model, quickly, should lead 
to more new firms. 
 Making Government Work for Entrepreneurs. President Obama issued an 
Executive Order to federal agencies to identify and eliminate or reduce processes that are 
overly cumbersome to entrepreneurs. I find that entrepreneurs bear the initial risk and 
uncertainty associated with starting a business, so any policy that reduces the amount of 
time it takes to create a new firm, or get a product to market, should alleviate some of the 
burden. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office is also giving entrepreneurs greater control 
over the application process, which will allow entrepreneurs to request prioritized 
examination. 
 Inspiring the Next Generation of Entrepreneurs. A number of programs will be 
supported that provide tools and guidance to students testing ideas in high-potential, 
emerging industries, as well as in marketing, design, and the arts. One of the principal 
findings in this dissertation is that there is no one type of entrepreneur. Extant research 
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also questions the possibility of selecting highly successful businesses ex ante (Kerr & 
Nanda, 2009). Therefore, it is good practice to design policy to encourage the creation 
and growth of new ventures in all industries, not only those with a (potentially) higher 
probability of creating jobs. 
 This dissertation‟s findings also have implications for private providers of capital, 
such as banks. Prior literature on personal assets and entrepreneurship finds that people 
with more assets are more likely to be self-employed, and that windfall gains (e.g., 
inheritance, lottery winnings) increase the likelihood of success (Evans & Jovanovic, 
1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994; Lindh & Ohlsson, 1996). However, I find 
that as net worth increases, the likelihood of starting a new firm is the same as the 
likelihood of disengaging. Whether disengaging leads to default on a bank loan, I am 
unable to determine from the PSED II sample. If rates of disengagement are correlated to 
rates of default, then the more banks can develop a personal relationship with borrowers, 
the better. 
 Bankers, and other financiers, should pay particular attention to both the business 
model, and the growth aspirations of the nascent entrepreneur. I find that nascent 
entrepreneurs desiring to grow a firm as large as possible are much less likely to create a 
new firm. The amount and type of resources available to the entrepreneur need to match 
the business model, particularly the likelihood of the model‟s success and the amount of 
time that it will take to bring the product or service to market. A disconnect between 
financing and the business model is an indicator of future disengagement. 
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Implications for Nascent Entrepreneurs 
 In 2008, the S&P 500 (the stock market index used as a measure of overall stock 
prices) fell from approximately 1,400 to a 13-year low of 676.53; and at the same time, 
commitments to venture capital partnerships dropped to around $25 billion, or 17% of 
stock market capitalization (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010). Also, between 2004 and 2008 the 
number of IPOs dropped to below 50 per year, compared to 150 in prior years (2010). For 
the nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II sample, direct impacts of this drought in VC and 
IPO activity are unlikely. Less than half of one percent of all start-ups even receives 
venture capital in a given year, and as the PSED II is a representative sample only two 
cases report any venture capital financing. 
 However, 25% of nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II list their primary 
residence as the location of the nascent venture. The drop in housing prices and home 
foreclosures may have affected the ability of these individuals to start a business. With 
lower housing prices comes lower net worth (the home typically being the primary asset). 
Low net worth, combined with banks reluctant (or unable) to make loans may adversely 
affect a nascent entrepreneur‟s ability to acquire financial resources. Analyzing the 
availability of bank financing, over time, for emerging ventures using the PSED II may 
not yield the most accurate results given the nature of the sample. These are individuals 
in the process of starting a venture, so many of the respondents may have already 
acquired money from banks prior to the first interview. Also, it is expected that the 
average amount of money acquired from banks will drop over time as individuals already 
acquiring bank financing are less likely to return and ask for more. Nonetheless, I did add 
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the total amount of financing acquired by all respondents, for each year between 2005 
and 2010. I also added the amount of bank financing (either in the form of loans or a 
bank line of credit) for each year. Table 5.1 depicts these amounts. The average amount 
of overall financing acquired by respondents steadily rises with each 12-month follow-up 
interview. The average amount of money acquired from banks rises until 2007-2008, and 
then drops significantly between 2008 and 2010. However, it is difficult to determine 
whether this trend reflects macroeconomic trends. Note the spike in bank financing 
between Wave B and Wave C – from an average of $74,791 to $251,119. This may 
indicate that nascent entrepreneurs, on average, acquire bank financing 2 to 3 years into 
the creation of the business, with only a few returning to the bank for more loans or lines 
of credit. 
 











    
Total $62,824,732  $65,176,409  $61,937,075 $55,587,480  $56,965,100 
Avg. $62,761 $125,339 $ 172,047  $215,455 $248,755 
Bank Financing     
Total $5,671,900 $2,841,588 $7,579,000 $2,018,423 $3,566,400 
Avg. $25,168 $74,791 $251,753 $189,119  $133,566  
 
Table 5.1 : Amount of Financing Acquired, By Year (All Sources and Bank Only) 
 
 The findings in this dissertation indicate that the standard financing narrative of 
“friends, family, and fools” is not accurate. Over 92% of nascent entrepreneurs use their 
own money (84%, if only considering personal savings used prior to formal firm 
registration), while 18.8% acquire money from relatives, 17% use a credit card, and 12% 
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use bank loans. Only 6.4% of nascent entrepreneurs used money acquired from friends or 
work colleagues. Based on these findings, as well as conversations with entrepreneurs 
who I invite to speak to my students (see the anecdote at the start of Chapter 1), the 
principal source of start-up financing is going to be the founder‟s personal savings, and 
possibly credit cards. Nascent entrepreneurs should be fully prepared to bear the initial 
financial risk. Even a high-potential, valuable opportunity can fail to attract outside 
capital if the entrepreneur does not risk his or her own money up front. Investors want to 
see that the entrepreneur is committed to seeing the idea through to market. Personal 
financing is an important way to signal this commitment. 
 Nascent entrepreneurs should also scrutinize their own growth aspirations. I find 
that growth expectations are inversely related to the likelihood of success. Other studies 
find the same relationship between growth and the acquisition of external funds (Gartner, 
et al., In Press). Growth takes time. If the entrepreneur does not have the financing to 
sustain long periods of negative cash flow, the venture is likely to fail. 
 While the importance of financing should not be underestimated, nascent 
entrepreneurs who are just starting out should understand that the primary reasons for 
disengagement from the start-up process are personal in nature. Only 12% in the United 






Implications for Researchers 
 The study of nascent entrepreneurs is essentially the study of the creation of 
organizations. This dissertation shows that organizational, management, and 
entrepreneurship scholars concerned with the earliest stages of firm creation need to pay 
close attention not only to aspects of the environment and the firm, but also to the 
thoughts, characteristics, and actions of the founder. While this dissertation find 
entrepreneurs and the firms they create to vary both within and between different 
categorizations, certain people have easier access to resources such as financing, location, 
and social capital. 
 Theoretical perspectives on risk and information asymmetries ultimately reflect 
differing ideas on the role of the entrepreneur in the economy. Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs are innovators, while Knightian entrepreneurs are residual claimants (i.e., 
business owners) who bear uncertainty and insure the financier. For Kirzner and the 
Austrian school, alertness to market disequilibrium is the hallmark of the entrepreneur 
(Kirzner, 1978, 1997). According to Shane and Venkataraman, entrepreneurship is the 
discovery and evaluation of opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). One of the 
principal findings of this dissertation – that the risk of disengagement is more closely 
associated with the entrepreneur‟s personal life – supports a stream of research that 
explores risk as a multidimensional construct, where risk differs across individuals and 
situations (Miller, 2007). Given that 38% of nascent entrepreneurs in the U.S. are 
disengaging for personal, health, and family reasons, research investigating the risks of 
entrepreneurship should take into account these determinants. When designing constructs 
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it is also necessary to gauge the entrepreneur‟s level of awareness that these determinants 
may affect outcomes. 
 The negative relationship between growth intentions and new firm creation is an 
indication that risk constructs should also measure resource matching – proper 
exploitation of the opportunity (i.e., the right business model) to the right types and 
amounts of critical resources. Also, based on the finding that minorities are more likely to 
use informal sources of financing compared to formal sources, researchers should 
consider how formal and informal institutions interact with personal characteristics to 
affect financing outcomes. For example, research on the solar energy sector finds that 
state-sponsored incentives, as well as shared social norms of family interdependence, are 
related to new firm entry into the sector (Meek, Pacheco, & York, 2010). 
 Recall discussions about the entrepreneur‟s perceptions of financing as the 
principal problem. Among nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED II, 28% said the main 
problem they faced was acquiring financing, and a further 11.2% said the main problem 
was keeping costs down. Yet, at the moment of actual disengagement only 12.3% said 
financing problems were the reason for quitting. Of the 273 nascent entrepreneurs in the 
PSED II sample that stated financing as the main problem in starting a business, 119 
(45%) disengage from the process at some point in the subsequent four years. 
Organizational outcomes (e.g., the creation of a new firm or improved performance) may 





 The heterogeneity of the PSED II sample reveals the variation underlying the 
creation of new businesses. This dissertation‟s examination of outlier nascent 
entrepreneurs – the macro-financers and non-financers – depicts many types of firms 
started by people from a multitude of socioeconomic backgrounds. It was my intention to 
uncover commonalities among successful entrepreneurs in each outlier group, using a 
non-distributional approach similar to recent research on firm performance. However, 
given the variation among both successful and unsuccessful nascent ventures, a cluster 
analysis might better reveal commonalities and differences among different 
categorizations. Successful macro-financed new firms are rare events, and very few are 
represented in the sample. An oversampling of these firms, drawing from high-growth 
industries, would have improved the analyses in this dissertation. I am aware of only one 
national sample that includes an oversampling of high-potential firms, and that is the 
CAUSEE study administered by the Queensland University of Technology in Australia. 
 Defining a successful outcome is subject to debate. The PSED II defines a new 
firm as one that has achieved positive monthly cash flow for at least 6 out of 12 months 
in the year preceding the interview. In reality, there are a number of firms that by any 
other definition could be considered successful. Consider Amazon which did not make 
money during its initial years. It may be that a percentage of the “still trying” nascent 
entrepreneurs in the PSED II are already affecting prices and quantities in the market. 
From a public policy perspective, a successful start-up is one that generates jobs or 
commercializes new technologies. The PSED II is made up predominantly of home-
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based, sole-proprietorships. This is due to the representative nature of the sample, which 
again is great for generalizability of results, but can make it difficult to examine the start-
up process from a policy perspective. 
 Common methods bias is a potential limitation of this study. Systemic error 
variance from measurement items in the survey (e.g., item T1 asking about the size of the 
business) can bias research findings when the variance either inflates or deflates the true 
nature of the construct of interest (e.g., the true size of the firm) (Doty & Glick, 1998). In 
this dissertation, I incorporate variables utilized by other PSED scholars, and I check for 
partial correlation in each model (Meade, Watson, & Kroustalis, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
measures in the PSED are self-reported. In fact, a number of respondents indicate that 
they enjoyed and learned from the process of answering the phone interviewers‟ 
questions. These respondents were more excited than before to start a business. When 
asked why, many respondents said that many of the questionnaire items got them 
thinking about start-up issues that they had never thought about. Others said that they felt 
validated. Keep in mind that each interview took well over an hour to complete. Doty and 
Glick (1998) suggest a meta-analysis to properly assess this level of bias. From other 
studies using multiple traits (i.e., firm and individual characteristics), one could gather the 
estimates from the correlation matrices, and discrepancies between observed and true 
relationships would be defined as a function of the concreteness of individual constructs 
(1998). 
 It is not clear that the pecking-order theory of financing reflects a planned strategy 
on the part of the entrepreneur, or if individuals are simply using resources that are easy 
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to acquire. Future research in this area might control for the value of the opportunity to 
see whether this has an effect on attracting external financing, especially formal financing 
from banks and investors. Also, my empirical investigation of pecking order theory tests 
what types of financing are used throughout the process, by sample wave. It does not 
specifically test when financing occurs. Event history analysis could investigate the 
sequence of financing in the context of other start-up activities. 
 In the end, the use of financing as a variable is noisy. Some entrepreneurs seek 
financing when they don‟t need it, and those efforts can distract from spending time on 
more critical aspects of the venture. Other entrepreneurs do not devote enough attention 
to financing, or underestimate what they need. As Gartner, et al. point out (In Press), 
nascent entrepreneurs may do a poor job accurately assessing the viability and value of 
opportunities they pursue. Nascent entrepreneurs also may not accurately perceive their 
own abilities, or the types of risks they face (Baron, 2007). 
 
Future Research 
 Future research on entrepreneurial risk as it relates to financing might investigate 
more robust constructs that capture multiple dimensions of risk. If measures of Knightian 
risk (e.g., occupational choice) are correlated with Schumpeterian concepts (e.g., factors 
related to the successful commercialization of innovations); then policies promoting one 
form of entrepreneurship should promote the other. Promoting self-employment across 
society may also drive overall innovation in the economy. 
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 Further investigation of the macro-financers “still trying” after five years in 
process would answer questions on the role of wealth and new venture creation. These 
macro-financers do not seem to be implementing more complex business models. Are 
they working on the start-up for so long because an escalation of commitment makes it 
difficult to disengage? Is the sunk cost too much to bear? Could it be that large amounts 
of financing allow entrepreneurs to experiment more, until they get it “just right”? 
Alternatively, are these individuals just dabbling in entrepreneurship, enjoying the 
process (perhaps as a hobby), having no clear goal in mind? More research assessing the 
value of the opportunities pursued, and the entrepreneur‟s intentions, is needed to answer 
these questions. 
 To compare the three groups of financers in the PSED II, ANOVA can be used 
(or its non-parametric equivalents) to test how the non-financers and macro-financers 
differ from one another, and from average-financers – and to test for success and failure 
rates between each group. Since ANOVA assumes that the dependent variable is interval 
in nature (categories are ordered and evenly spaced), a Kruskal-Wallis test can 
investigate outcomes among each group. Wilcox tests can look at unique variables that 
prior research considers to be associated with high-potential firms, one by one, to see if 
they explain variance within the financing groups. These variables include whether patent 
applications have been filed, education levels, and industry expertise. Reynolds and 
Curtin (2008) identify a small proportion of firms in the PSED II that expected to 
generate a lot of income and create a lot of jobs. These high-potential nascent ventures 
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are defined as providing over 50 jobs, or generating $4 million in annual sales at the end 
of the first five years as a new firm. 
 Empirically testing when in the process nascent entrepreneurs received or put in 
money is a further avenue of research. First, event history analysis can reveal if people 
using little money do so because they disengage early, and why they disengage (e.g., the 
opportunity is low-value, health problems, resource constraints). A multi-level growth 
modeling approach could take this a step further. First, the individual start-up activities in 
the PSED II can be plotted on a graph, showing when each activity was completed over 
the length of the entire process. These individual “growth” trajectories can then be 
examined to detect overall trends within the sample. The analysis would reveal which 
activities take place first, and which take place later in the process. These trajectories can 
also be examined to reveal differences between individual cases, revealing what types of 
nascent entrepreneurs follow which type of sequence. 
 
Conclusions 
 Chapter 1 investigated whether money matters for getting into business. Nascent 
entrepreneurs that start new firms use more money than those that disengage from the 
process. However, money alone does not improve the odds of success. It is likely that 
successful nascent entrepreneurs are better judges of their own capabilities, and therefore 
match their resources (internal or acquired) to the opportunity pursued. Good money 
attracts good opportunities. That high growth aspirations are negatively correlated to the 
creation of new firms seems to support this notion. Also, a high percentage of macro-
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financers (i.e., individuals using more than $230,000 to start a new venture) work on their 
start-ups for longer periods of time. Non-financers disengage from the process at higher 
rates. This is an indication that nascent entrepreneurs that do realize the opportunity they 
are pursuing is out of reach (or low in value) disengage before committing more 
resources. Future research in this area must control for the value of the opportunity 
pursued to determine the extent this is indeed the case. 
 Nascent entrepreneurs predominantly disengage for personal reasons that have 
nothing to do with financial resources. Researchers investigating organizational creation 
should ensure that measures relating to risk reflect the multidimensionality of the 
construct. That is, risk is not just a cost-benefit analysis that compares wage work to 
entrepreneurship, nor is it solely an assessment of an opportunity‟s value and whether the 
entrepreneur‟s skills and knowledge are sufficient to exploit it. 
 Chapter 2 investigated whether nascent entrepreneurs follow a pattern when 
acquiring specific sources of financing. Over 90% of all nascent entrepreneurs use 
personal money to finance their start-ups, and two-thirds use only personal money. 
Financing from banks and other external sources tends to come later in the process of 
creating a new venture, if at all. Researchers and policymakers should consider whether 
the sequential nature of financing reveals the nascent entrepreneur‟s choice, or the 
presence of barriers to capital acquisition. The analysis in this chapter shows that females 
and minorities are much less likely than males and non-minorities to acquire formal 
sources of financing, such as from banks or professional investors. 
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 Chapters 3 and 4 examined two outlier groups of nascent entrepreneurs in more 
detail – non-financers that use little to no money, and macro-financers that use vast 
amounts of money. Macro-financers are not readily identifiable based on personal 
characteristics. Hence, attempts at targeting certain types of people to create high-growth 
ventures are not likely to be successful. Targeting industries or regions is more likely to 
lead to the creation of high-impact firms. And, these efforts should be combined with 
measures to ensure equal opportunities for all to access external financing. Statistically, 
non-financers also vary widely by demographics, socioeconomic backgrounds, and the 
types of businesses created. Nominally, however, non-financers are commonly found in 
metro areas, have a post-graduate level education, and have started at least two prior 
start-ups. This supports prior research findings showing that human and social capital can 
act as substitutes for a lack of financial capital. 
 Nascent entrepreneurship is a story of variation, not of averages and means. Many 
types of people start many types of firms. Nascent entrepreneurship is also a story of 
perceived risk, opportunity, and personal capabilities. Some use more resources than is 
necessary, while others do not use enough. Future research in entrepreneurial finance and 
resource acquisition must account for the non-distributional nature of the phenomenon to 
answer questions related to process outcomes of resource-rich and resource-poor 
entrepreneurs. It must also consider how formal institutions (e.g., laws and policy) and 
informal institutions (e.g., social mores and norms) interact with the personal 














PSED II Research Program 
 
 This appendix details the PSED research program‟s rationale and design. The 
information in this section is based entirely on documentation available from the Panel 
Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics website, hosted by the University of Michigan 
Institute for Social Research: http://www.psed.isr.umich.edu/psed/home. 
 
Program Rationale and Description 
 The principal contribution of the PSED research program is the advancement of 
scholarly understanding of the firm creation process (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b). The 
PSED II includes a wide range of independent variables that tracks initiatives of nascent 
entrepreneurs from inception to the early years of an operation new firm (2007b). 
Another contribution is the generalizability of the data, “Because the PSED II cohort 
represents all business start-up activity in the US, inferences about the entire population 
of 12 million nascent entrepreneurs that are creating 7 million nascent enterprises are 
justified.” (2007b). Reynolds and Curtin (2007b) further explain: 
 
Only one extant research program, the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
provides detailed information on a representative national sample involved in the 
firm creation process. The PSED research program provides data describing the 
start-up phase of the business dynamic processes…[it is] the basis for three types 
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of analysis: (1) what types of individuals and teams enter the firm start-up 
process; (2) what happens during the start-up process; and (3) what features of the 
individuals (or teams) and their activity are associated with different outcomes –
new firm, disengagement, or continuation of the start-up effort. 
 
Project Design  
 The overall research design assumes that individuals transition into nascent 
entrepreneurship when they begin to take some action to create a new firm. Nascent 
entrepreneurs are drawn from the adult population as independent nascent entrepreneurs 
– or if from an existing business, as nascent “intrapreneurs” (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). 
The second transition will either be the creation of a new firm, or disengagement. A new 
firm is defined as an independent commercial actor in the economy, affecting the prices 
and quantities of goods traded in the market (2008). The specifics of the research design 
for the screening questions, and the first two waves of the detailed interviews, are 
described by Reynolds and Curtin (2007b, 2008) below: 
 
The research procedure consists of three phases. The first is identifying a 
representative sample of those actively involved in the new firm creation process, 
the nascent entrepreneurs. They are identified from phone interviews completed 
with adults from a representative sample of households that meet four criteria: 1) 
they consider themselves as involved in the firm creation process, 2) they have 
engaged in some start-up activity in the past 12 months, 3) they expect to own all 
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or part of the new firm, and 4) the initiative has not progressed to the point it may 
be considered an operating business. For PSED II, 31,845 individuals were 
screened to locate 1,214 nascent entrepreneurs from October 2005 to January 
2006; the average time required for this screening module was 2 minutes. These 
nascent entrepreneurs represent 12 million individuals between the ages of 18 and 
74 years old. 
The second phase involved the completion of a 60 minute phone interview 
that covers a wide range of topics related to the initiation of a new firm. While the 
screening was completed by a commercial survey firm, the detailed data is 
collected by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. The topics 
covered are summarized in the “Wave A” column in [Table A-1]… 
…The third phase involved the follow-up phone interviews, also about 60 
minutes long. Careful scheduling has allowed the initial contact for the first 
follow-up to occur 52 weeks following completion of the initial detailed 
interview, the second follow-up 104 weeks, and so forth. The topics of the 
interview are listed in the “Wave B” column in [Table A-1] and vary depending 
on the status of the initiative at the time of the follow-up. Those nascent 
entrepreneurs that report they have disengaged from the initiative (quit) receive a 
few questions about start-up activity and a few items about the reasons for their 
decision. All others receive most of the same interview schedule provided in the 
first interview, which provides them with a chance to update their case file with 
reports of new activity or changes in the start-up team or financial structure. 
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Screening questions  All     
Assessment of criteria for nascent entrepreneur  All     
Socio-demographic  All     
     
A.1: Why involved, business opportunity (open ended)   All   
A.2: Confirm same business activity    All  All  
A.3: Determine status: new firm, quit, continue    All  All  
B: Type of business, location   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
C: Legal form   All  All  All  
D: Start-up activities   All  All  All  
E.1: Start-up finances, entry into firm registries (3)   All  All  All  
E.2: Confirm quit, exit interview    Quits Quits  
F: Orientations toward competition   All  NF  NF  
G: Owners, key non-owners, & helpers inventory   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
H: Owner demographics   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
J: Relationships among owners   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
K: Juristic (legal entity) owners   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
M: Key non-owner demographics   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
N: Helper demographics   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
P: Community resources, support for new firms   All  NF  NF  
Q: Informal start-up financial support   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
R: Legal entity start-up investments, debts, net worth   All  NF,SU  NF,SU  
S: Competitive strategy and target markets   All  NF  NF  
T: Growth expectations   All  NF  NF  
U.1: Respondent’s motivation   All   
U.2: Employment structure (3)    NF NF  
V.1: Expense structure: summary (3)    NF  
V.2: Expense structure: detailed (3)     NF 
X: Respondent’s career background   All  SU SU  
Y: Respondent’s self-descriptions   All    
Z: Respondent & household socio-demographics   All  NF,SU NF,SU  
NOTES: (1) After wave A, modules are provided to All respondents, only those that Quit, or 
those with a new firm (NF), or still active in the start-up process (SU).  
(2) After initial interview, modules are repeated to capture changes or new information about 
the activity or details on the current status.  
(3) Based on Kauffman Firm Survey interview schedule (Mathematical Policy Research, 2007).  
 
Table A-1 : Overview of Interview Schedule Modules (Reynolds & Curtin, 2007b) 




 The nascent entrepreneur‟s efforts to create a business will result in one of three 
outcomes: (1) a new firm; (2) continuation of the process; or (3) disengagement from the 
process. In order to be considered a “new firm”, each of the following three conditions 
must be met (item numbers from questionnaire included): 
 
1.  (A30) Has this business received any money, income, or fees from the sale of 
goods or services for more than six of the past twelve months? 
2. (A32) Has the monthly revenue been more than the monthly expenses for more 
than six of the past twelve months? 
3. (A34) Were salaries or wages of the owners who were active in managing the 
business included in the monthly expenses for more than six of the past twelve 
months? 
 
 Finally, the respondent has to answer yes to the following (A41): “It would appear 
that you are an operating business – one with sales and revenue greater than the ongoing 
expenses including salaries. Would you agree with this description of the current 
business?” 
 A nascent entrepreneur is considered “still trying” if he or she did not meet the 





1. Answers “yes” to both: 
a. (A37) In the past twelve months, since the first interview, have you 
devoted more than 160 hours – 4 weeks of full time work – to this 
business start-up? 
b. (A38) Over the next six months, do you expect to spend more than 80 
hours – 2 weeks of full time work – on this business start-up? 
2. Answers “no” or “I don‟t know” to either A37 or A38 above, and “yes” to: 
a. (A40) Do you consider this business start-up to be a major focus of your 
work career over the next twelve months? 
3. Answers “no” to A41, and “actively involved” to: 
a. (A42) Do you consider yourself to be actively involved with the new 
business start-up, or disengaged from it? 
 
 A nascent entrepreneur is considered to have “disengage” if for either item A15, 
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